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ABSTRACT 
 This Article investigates the costs and benefits of racial profiling in 
the context of drug interdiction. I begin by reviewing the empirical 
economic and civil rights literature regarding the existence and 
rationality of racial profiling and then build an explicit model of a 
trooper’s decision to search a stopped vehicle. Estimating the model 
using stop and search data from a portion of Interstate 95 in 
Maryland, I find that the Maryland State Police use the motorist’s 
race as a factor in deciding which stopped vehicles to search. This 
result persists even after controlling for many other descriptive 
variables that impact the trooper’s decision to search. I then introduce 
an additional model that controls for race’s role in the search decision 
and estimates the counterfactual: the change in the amount of drugs 
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the police would find if they ignored race as a factor in the search 
decision. Applying that model, I find that race is the strongest 
predictor of identifying drug traffickers, but that racial profiling 
comes at significant cost, as black motorists who are subject to search 
are also more likely to be innocent than their white counterparts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although the term is less than twenty years old,1 “racial 
profiling”—the act of investigating a particular racial group because 
of a belief that members of the group are more likely to commit 
certain crimes—has a long history in the United States. The practice 
began before the country did, in colonial times, when blacks were 
subject to greater policing because of a belief that they were more 
likely to commit crimes.2 Perhaps the largest single act of racial 
 
 1. Jerome H. Skolnick & Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drugs, and Profiling: Ways to Target 
Guns and Minimize Racial Profiling, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 419 n.36 (2001). 
 2. RICHARD MIDDLETON, COLONIAL AMERICA: A HISTORY, 1607–1760, at 283–91 
(1992). 
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profiling in this country, the Japanese American internment,3 
occurred much more recently. During World War II (WWII), 120,000 
individuals of Japanese ancestry—two-thirds of whom were 
American citizens—were forced from their homes because of the 
belief that they were more likely to commit espionage or sabotage 
against the United States.4 German and Italian Americans were also 
the object of racial profiling during WWII, but of a less severe variety: 
they had to register with the police, abide by curfews, and submit to 
loyalty interviews.5 As with Japanese Americans, people in those 
ethnic groups were considered more likely to commit acts of sabotage 
and espionage.6 
The Japanese American internment serves as a cautionary tale 
about racial profiling after a direct attack on our nation. One hundred 
twenty thousand people were interned, at least in part, because of 
racist, degrading stereotypes. But it may be the case that Japanese 
Americans were more likely to engage in espionage and sabotage 
than other ethnic groups.7 Even if that were so, internment cannot be 
considered an appropriate policy response. Fruitful discussion of what 
would be an appropriate policy, however, requires the unpleasant 
acknowledgment that race or ethnicity may be associated, as a 
 
 3. See Exec. Order No. 9066, Feb. 19, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942) (authorizing 
the secretary of war to designate “military areas” from which “any and all persons may be 
excluded”); General DeWitt’s Public Proclamation No. 1, March 2, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320 
(March 26, 1942) (designating military areas on the West Coast); see also Civilian Exclusion 
Order No. 34, May 3, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 3967 (May 28, 1942) (excluding persons of Japanese 
ancestry from Alameda County, California). 
 4. This belief has little support in historical fact. See Eric L. Muller, Betrayal on Trial: 
Japanese-American “Treason” in World War II, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1759, 1760–62 (2004) 
(discussing the extremely limited data on disloyalty among the Japanese and Japanese 
Americans interned). 
 5. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 2526, Dec. 8, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 6323 (Dec. 10, 1941) 
(referring to Germans); Proclamation No. 2527, Dec. 8, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 6324 (Dec. 10, 1941) 
(referring to Italians). These measures were taken under the auspices of Executive Order 9066, 
the same order that granted authority for the Japanese American internment. Indeed, on its 
face, Executive Order 9066 applied to all people, as it did not mention particular ethnicities and 
only referenced “enemy aliens” in passing. Exec. Order No. 9066, Feb. 19, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 
1407 (Feb. 25, 1942). 
 6. A small number of German and Italian Americans, primarily recent immigrants, were 
also interned during the war. See generally Proclamation No. 2526 (German enemy aliens); 
Proclamation No. 2527 (Italian enemy aliens). 
 7. One might suggest, for example, that people of Chinese ancestry would be less likely to 
engage in espionage and sabotage for the Japanese. This is, of course, speculation, as was the 
assumption that the Japanese Americans interned in World War II were more likely to be 
saboteurs, but both of these examples simply suggest that we do not know what the empirical 
data would demonstrate. 
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descriptive matter, with some criminal activities.8 Whether the 
Japanese Americans were more likely to be spies or saboteurs, and, if 
so, how much more likely, bears on the best strategy for preventing 
such activities and need not reinforce stereotypes or cause society to 
succumb to irrational hysteria. If the internment incapacitated only a 
small number of potential saboteurs, there may have been more 
efficient ways of dealing with the threat. Without quantifying the 
costs and benefits of using ethnicity as a factor in deciding who the 
likely saboteurs were, one cannot separate empirical facts from 
stereotypes. One may, of course, argue that in such circumstances, 
constitutional rights trump the empirical situation and render it 
irrelevant. But when the United States has faced a grave threat, 
society has not treated constitutional rights as sacrosanct. 
Policymakers curtail rights in an effort to combat the perceived 
threat, and, as with the Japanese American internment, courts may 
well sanction the sacrifice of individual rights if they are convinced 
that the situation is grave enough.9 Understanding the empirical 
component is, therefore, critical to discussions of both policy and the 
law. 
Few people would confuse the war on drugs with WWII, but 
both have been occasions for racial profiling. One would think that 
the disentangling of fact from stereotype would be easier in the 
context of drug interdiction than it was in the earlier era. Although 
the United States knew little about the relative prevalence of 
saboteurs among Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans 
compared to other categories of Americans, there is a growing body 
of data on highway stops and searches that, theoretically, could 
illuminate racially differential rates of drug use and drug trafficking in 
the United States. Thus, empirical fact could be separated from 
baseless stereotype and racist speculation in deciding whether race is 
a reliable marker of the likelihood that a given driver is carrying 
drugs. 
But even these data are not free of assumptions and stereotypes. 
Not only does society shape views—including stereotypes and 
 
 8. Recent scholarship acknowledges that some response may have been prudent, but that 
the extreme measures used were too drastic. Eric L. Muller, Inference or Impact? Racial 
Profiling and the Internment’s True Legacy, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 103, 116–17 (2003). 
 9. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944) (“[W]hen under conditions of 
modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be 
commensurate with the threatened danger.”). 
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assumptions—but views also shape society and how it is described 
empirically. Look for drug couriers only among blacks and some will 
be found; however, no white drug couriers will be found within this 
group. Then, look at the people who have been arrested and jailed, 
and it is easy to see how the initial perceptions of criminality get 
reinforced. Over decades, a stereotype that blacks are more likely to 
engage in criminal activity can transform itself into large and 
statistically significant differences in arrest and incarceration rates for 
blacks and whites. 
There is some data suggesting that American society has 
experienced this form of self-fulfilling racial bias in drug prosecutions. 
For example, black youth are seen as more likely than white youth to 
engage in drug use and violent behavior; arrest and incarceration 
rates reinforce this perception.10 Yet self-reported data11 consistently 
reveals that except for homicide, black and white youth have similar 
propensities to commit violent crimes, and blacks are, if anything, less 
likely than whites to use illegal drugs.12 
Because biases can be reinforced through action, an initial focus 
on blacks as drug couriers will be validated and reinforced by the 
data: police will believe that their profile is accurate because they 
arrest more blacks for drug possession. Put simply, the data on stop 
and search rates and the data on arrest and incarceration rates alone 
cannot demonstrate that blacks are more likely to be guilty of drug-
related offenses. Without a determination of this empirical issue, one 
cannot separate fact from stereotype in the debate surrounding racial 
profiling as a tool of drug interdiction. 
 
 10. In 2001, blacks accounted for 34.5 percent of the drug violation arrests and 44.5 percent 
of the prison and jail population, but only 13.2 percent of the general population. FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 252 t.43 (2001), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/01cius.htm; ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT 
MIDYEAR 2001, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 12 t.14 
(April 2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim01.pdf; U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES 1, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/ 
asrh/NC-EST2003/NC-EST2003-03.pdf. 
 11. Self-reported data is based upon a random sample of individuals, rather than a biased 
selection method, and therefore is not systematically biased to overrepresent black and 
Hispanic drug use. 
 12. In 2001, 6.8 percent of whites and 6.9 percent of blacks surveyed reported using illegal 
drugs in the last month. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF APPLIED 
STUDIES, 2001 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE & HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES fig. 2.12 (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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This Article seeks to separate fact from stereotype by estimating 
empirically the extent to which the stereotypes used to justify racial 
profiling are based on actual propensities to commit drug crimes. In 
particular, the Article investigates the counterfactual: what would 
police find if they did not use race in deciding whom to search during 
highway traffic stops? In doing so, I seek to quantify the potential 
benefits and costs of using race as a factor in the decision to search a 
stopped car. What would society lose, in terms of the amount of drugs 
seized, if the police did not engage in racial profiling? What would 
society gain, in terms of the number of innocent motorists who would 
not be searched, if racial profiling was not used? 
Before answering these questions, however, it will be useful to 
articulate a more precise definition of racial profiling. As I use the 
phrase, racial profiling occurs when race or ethnicity is used as a 
factor in deciding whom to subject to more intrusive police contact 
(generally a stop, search, or arrest), excluding those cases in which the 
police are looking for a specific suspect whose race is known. Racial 
profiling involves the belief—be it racist, rational, or a combination of 
the two—that certain crimes are committed disproportionately by a 
particular race. Thus, stopping and searching a car speeding on the 
highway because the driver is black and the officer believes (or has 
been told) that blacks are more likely to be drug couriers is racial 
profiling. Stopping and searching a car speeding on the highway 
because the driver is black and the officer has been told that a black 
man sped away from a drug bust is not racial profiling, although it 
may still be inappropriate, depending on the level of individualized 
suspicion.13 
In Part I, I briefly review the racial profiling debate. In 
particular, I explore how the empirical literature has failed to model 
 
 13. One extreme example of an inappropriate police response to a witness description 
involving race is found in Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999), in which the 
Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of Equal Protection claims against the city. Id. at 334. In 
Brown, the victim, robbed at knifepoint, described her attacker as a young black man and said 
that his right hand had been cut during the robbery. Id. The police responded by stopping over 
two hundred black individuals and asking to see the individual’s right hand. Id. The City of 
Oneonta had fewer than three hundred black residents (not all young men), and approximately 
one hundred fifty black college students (also not all men) residing within its borders. Id. While 
deeply troubling, the police department’s use of race in this case was not racial profiling as I 
define it. For an argument that removing witness identification from the definition of racial 
profiling masks the racial justice issues at stake, see generally R. Richard Banks, Race-Based 
Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
1075 (2001). 
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the decision to search explicitly or to quantify the costs and benefits 
of racial profiling, although these models are critically relevant to the 
racial profiling debate. Then, in Part II, I introduce a model that 
determines whether the Maryland State Police (MSP) engaged in 
racial profiling on Interstate 95 (I-95) between 1997 and 2003. 
Specifically, I build a model of a state trooper’s decision to search a 
stopped vehicle and determine whether race is a salient factor in that 
model, after controlling for other factors that may influence that 
decision. Based upon the results of this model, I conclude that the 
MSP did engage in racial profiling on I-95. In Part III, I seek to 
quantify the effects of this racial profiling. I provide estimates of 
different drug interdiction outcomes, based upon different profiling 
strategies. Because the data on searches represent what the troopers 
found when they searched those vehicles they believed were most 
likely to contain drugs, rather than a random sample of stopped 
vehicles, I control for this selection criteria in the model I estimate. 
Based upon these models, I suggest several possible profiles for the 
MSP to use in its drug interdiction efforts and compare their costs and 
benefits. 
I.  THE RACIAL PROFILING DEBATE 
The term “racial profiling” entered the mainstream media in 
1987.14 At that time, the term referred to the police’s use of pretextual 
traffic stops, focused on blacks and Hispanics, as a method of drug 
interdiction. Colloquially, this was known as the offense of “driving 
while black.” The racial profiling debate focused on the facts—
whether racial profiling occurred—rather than the normative 
questions behind the facts—whether racial profiling was 
constitutional, and, if so, whether it should be allowed. By early 2001, 
most commentators, including then-U.S. Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, had denounced racial profiling.15 Civil rights advocates 
argued that the available data suggested that racial profiling was 
rampant and was, at best, lazy policing that was counterproductive to 
 
 14. Skolnick & Caplovitz, supra note 1, at 419 n.36. 
 15. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John Ashcroft to Be Attorney General of 
the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 492 (2001) 
(response of Senator Ashcroft, stating that racial profiling is “wrong and unconstitutional no 
matter what the context”). 
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drug interdiction goals;16 conservative commentators countered that 
the data showed that police used variables correlated with both race 
and drug possession in deciding whom to stop and search, and that no 
invidious discrimination was evident.17 Finally, economists had a 
different perspective on the racial profiling issue: to them, the 
question was not whether racial profiling occurred, but whether it was 
a rational use of limited police resources.18 
The debate shifted significantly after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. One could not help but notice that all nineteen 
hijackers were young Arab men; it seemed foolish to ignore this 
information.19 Those commentators who previously argued about 
whether racial profiling was happening were now arguing over the 
conditions under which racial profiling was acceptable, either 
 
 16. See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING 
CANNOT WORK 78–90 (2002) (citing hit rate statistics to demonstrate that “[r]acial profiling is 
neither an efficient nor an effective tool for fighting crime”); William H. Buckman & John 
Lamberth, Challenging Racial Profiles: Attacking Jim Crow on the Interstate, 10 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 388 (2001) (noting that “as few as one in thirty stops net contraband even 
as small as a single joint” and that “[t]his figure could be achieved in random stops of all 
travelers”); Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 
40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1197–1201 (2003) (reviewing empirical data). 
 17. See, e.g., Heather Mac Donald, The Racial Profiling Myth Debunked, CITY J., Spring 
2002, at 63–64 (“It turns out that the police stop blacks more for speeding because they speed 
more. Race has nothing to do with it.”), available at http://www.city-journal.org/ 
html/eon_3_27_02hm.html; Heather Mac Donald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, CITY J., Spring 
2001, at 26 (“Arlington has a 10 percent black population, but robbery victims identify nearly 70 
percent of their assailants as black [and a]s long as those numbers remain unchanged, police 
statistics will also look disproportionate.”), available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/ 
11_2_the_myth.html; John Derbyshire, In Defense of Racial Profiling: Where Is Our Common 
Sense?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 19, 2001, at http://www.nationalreview.com/ 19feb01/ 
derbyshire021901.shtml (“So long as race is only one factor in a generalized approach to the 
questioning of suspects, it may be considered.”). 
 18. See, e.g., John Knowles, Nicola Persico, & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle 
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 205 (2001) [hereinafter KPT] (proposing 
a test to distinguish between racially prejudiced searches and searches that use race as a factor 
only because it helps to “maximize successful searches”). For a more detailed discussion of the 
economics literature regarding racial profiling, see infra Part I.B. 
 19. There is, of course, a huge leap from the descriptive statement “the terrorists were 
young Arab men” and the speculative statement “young Arab men are more likely to be 
terrorists.” Two points should be made. First, not all terrorists are young Arab men. As has 
been noted elsewhere, the second deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil in recent history was 
committed by Timothy McVeigh, a European American. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. 
Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
651, 749 (2002). Second, the percentage of terrorists who are Arab men is likely quite different 
from the percentage of Arab men who are terrorists. The former may be reasonably large—
again, a supposition—and may well be a larger percentage than 0.25 percent, the percentage of 
the U.S. population constituting Arab men, but the latter is almost certainly quite small. 
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constitutionally or as a policy matter.20 The shift in the debate was 
certainly constructive because discussion of the normative question 
was missing from the initial debate. The evolving debate should not, 
however, lose sight of the factual questions. The first empirical 
question is whether the police engage in racial profiling. The second 
and more important question is whether the empirical assumption 
underlying racial profiling—that a particular minority group is more 
likely to engage in a given criminal activity—is accurate and, if so, 
what policy implications follow. 
The empirical literature on racial profiling has grown 
dramatically in the past several years as many jurisdictions have 
begun collecting data. As Professor Bernard Harcourt notes in his 
recent article, the literature is split into two separate strains.21 Legal 
scholars focus on the racial disparity between blacks and whites in 
stop, search, and find rates on the highway in an attempt to 
demonstrate that the police engage in racial profiling. Economists, in 
contrast, focus on the efficiency of police practices, using variations 
on a theoretical model of incentives for both the police and the 
individuals carrying drugs on the highway. Neither group of scholars, 
however, quantifies the benefits of racial profiling in terms of the 
additional drugs seized or drug traffickers arrested, nor does either 
group quantify the cost of racial profiling in terms of the number of 
innocent motorists searched. The goal of this Article is to fill this gap 
in the debate. 
Before moving to my empirical analysis, however, it is useful to 
describe the current empirical literature more fully. 
A. Civil Rights Empiricists 
Civil rights empiricists focus on the threshold racial profiling 
question: do the police engage in racial profiling? Civil rights 
 
 20. See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1413, 1414 & n.3 (2002) (gathering examples of the post-September 11 discussion of the 
benefits of racial profiling). 
 21. Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil 
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1275, 1276–77 (2004). While a generalization, this dichotomy provides a useful outline of 
the recent empirical literature on racial profiling. Perhaps the exception to my dichotomy is 
Professor Harcourt’s recent article itself, which provides a theoretical economic model of racial 
profiling. See id. at 1291–95, 1315–22 (dividing empirical racial profiling scholarship into 
“economics” and “civil liberties” strains). Although I do not use the same terminology as 
Professor Harcourt, the categories are essentially the same. 
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empiricists do not explicitly model the differing incentives of police 
and drivers. Nor do they quantify any potential benefit from racial 
profiling; unlike economists, they assume, for the most part, that any 
benefit from racial profiling is negligible at best. 
Professor David Harris epitomizes the approach of civil rights 
scholars.22 In his book, Profiles in Injustice, Harris details aggregate 
hit rates23 in several jurisdictions, arguing that equal hit rates in the 
face of disproportionate search rates demonstrates that the police are 
using race in their decisionmaking.24 Equal hit rates, according to 
Harris, demonstrate that blacks and whites offend at equal rates; a 
disparity in search rates, therefore, must be the result of racial 
animus.25 Several commentators, myself included, have criticized 
Harris’ reliance on hit rates as the sole evidence of racial profiling;26 
hit rates alone cannot prove or disprove whether the police engage in 
racial profiling.27 Because the police do not choose whom to search 
randomly, their selection criteria create a bias in hit rates; it is 
impossible to tell what the underlying rates of actual guilt are without 
information about the individuals who are not searched.28 
In addition, from the policymaking perspective, a focus on simple 
hit rates masks the importance of other potential drug interdiction 
goals, such as, for example, focusing on drug traffickers rather than 
drug possessors, or maximizing the amount of drugs seized. More 
importantly, however, the analyses of Harris and others do not 
control for nonracial explanations of the observed racial disparity.29 If, 
 
 22. John Lamberth’s multiple studies of racial profiling also fall within this category and 
have the same methodological flaws. For a list of his many studies, most commissioned by police 
departments themselves, see http://www.lamberthconsulting.com/about-racial-profiling/ 
research-articles.asp. 
 23. The term “hit rates” is shorthand for the proportion of searched vehicles in which the 
police found contraband to the total number of searched vehicles. 
 24. HARRIS, supra note 16, at 78–82. 
 25. Id. at 80. Professor Harris also argues that racial profiling makes for bad policing—that, 
as economists would say, it is irrational and inefficient—although he does not engage the 
theoretical possibility that racial profiling could be rational. Id. at 79. 
 26. Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 690–91 (describing a scenario in which equal hit rates 
would not indicate racial profiling); Harcourt, supra note 21, at 1316–17 (criticizing Harris’ focus 
on hit rates). 
 27. For an extended discussion of this proposition, see Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 
690–91. 
 28. See infra Part III.A and Figure 2 for a graphical example of how selection bias works. 
 29. See Buckman & Lamberth, supra note 16, at 394 (providing a blueprint for challenging 
racial profiling in court that relies solely on racial comparisons); Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, 
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for example, the police search young men in luxury cars at a higher 
rate, this may result in a statistically significant racial disparity in 
search rates if blacks are overrepresented in the population of young 
men in luxury cars driving on the highway, because the analyses do 
not control for alternative explanations of the data, such as searching 
young men in luxury cars. 
In a joint project with Professor Samuel Gross, I have also 
investigated whether the MSP engage in racial profiling.30 While 
recognizing that hit rates alone cannot prove discrimination, we argue 
that hit rates, combined with some information about underlying base 
rates of criminal activity, demonstrate that the MSP engage in racial 
profiling.31 While we investigate separately several possible 
explanations for the racial disparity in search rates, we do not model 
explicitly the decision to search a vehicle. Because of this modeling 
decision, we cannot differentiate between the portion of the disparity 
explained by racial profiling and the portion of the disparity 
explained by profiling on nonracial characteristics that are correlated 
with race. Thus, we do not quantify the extent of racial profiling. 
Rather, we conclude that the disparity is large enough that race must 
be a factor, because other variables could not explain why 60 percent 
of the motorists searched on I-95 were black, when blacks constituted 
only 17 percent of the drivers.32 Without a systematic model of the 
decision to search, however, we cannot simultaneously control for 
different possible factors that contribute to the large disparity and 
therefore cannot quantify the portion of the racial disparity explained 
by racial profiling. 
In sum, although the civil rights empiricists focus on one 
important aspect of racial profiling—whether it occurs—they neglect 
to model the complex process by which police make search decisions. 
Because of this, civil rights empiricists provide too simple a portrayal 
of the process in general, and racial profiling in particular. 
 
at 694 (asserting that “[t]he most likely explanation for this [racial] disparity is the obvious one: 
Maryland State troopers took race into account in deciding who to stop”). 
 30. Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 692. 
 31. Id. at 694. We assume that similar national rates of drug use across races imply similar 
base rates of drug possession on I-95. Id. at 691. 
 32. Id. at 692. 
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B. Economic Models of Racial Profiling 
In contrast to the civil rights empiricists who focus on the 
preliminary existence question, the economics literature on racial 
profiling focuses on whether racial profiling is rational (efficient) or 
irrational (inefficient).33 Professors John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and 
Petra Todd (KPT) provide the leading example of this type of 
empirical analysis.34 KPT create a theoretical economic model of “hit” 
rates—the percentage of searched individuals found with 
contraband—given the cost of searching. Drawing on the economic 
literature of discrimination in labor markets, KPT model racial 
animus as a “taste” for discrimination; specifically, racist police 
officers have a lower search cost for black motorists than for white 
ones.35 KPT demonstrate that, under the assumptions of their model, 
equal hit rates are consistent with rational discrimination rather than 
racial animus—or, to put it more forcefully, equal hit rates imply that 
any difference in search rates is justified by rational factors, whether 
based on race or not.36 They estimate the model using individual-level 
data on the searches conducted by the MSP from January 1995 
 
 33. One might think of economists’ focus on rationality as a determination of whether 
racial profiling has the limited benefit of being efficient, rather than based solely on racial 
animus. 
 34. KPT, supra note 18, at 227–28. 
 35. Id. at 205. 
 36. Id. at 228. KPT’s model is flexible enough to allow for different metrics of police 
success. KPT focus on hit rates—the percentage of searches that find contraband—but also 
estimate the role of racial animus in police behavior assuming that the police want to maximize 
the percentage of searches that find not just any quantity of drugs, but a quantity sufficient to 
constitute a felony. Id. at 224–26. In contrast to their hit rates model, KPT find that felony hit 
rates for whites and Hispanics are significantly lower than the black felony hit rate, suggesting 
that rational police behavior would be to search blacks more often. Id. at 226. However, KPT 
discount this conclusion based on felony hit rates, because it assumes police gain nothing from 
finding a small amount of drugs. Id. 
KPT also investigate the profiling of several other groups, including men and individuals 
driving luxury cars, and find no evidence of discrimination for these groups. Id. at 222–23. 
Economist David Bjerk criticizes KPT’s approach, noting that the model requires troopers to 
oversample black motorists even though, in equilibrium, black and white motorists have the 
same hit rates. David Bjerk, Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of a 
Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate 14–15 (Mar. 25, 2005) (working paper), available at 
http://socserv.socsci.mcmaster.ca/bjerk/papers.html. According to Bjerk, KPT’s model is directly 
contradictory to a straightforward definition of racial unbiasedness, where troopers search 
blacks and whites in proportion to their relative likelihood to carry drugs. Id. at 16–17. This 
criticism, however, ignores both the dynamic equilibrium KPT’s model presents, and the 
difficulty of accurately assessing the likelihood of carrying drugs for blacks and whites. 
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through January 199937 and find that blacks and whites have 
statistically indistinguishable hit rates.38 KPT conclude that the police 
do not engage in discrimination based upon racial animus—that is, 
the police behave as if they incur the same cost to searching blacks 
and searching whites.39 The advantage to KPT’s approach to 
identifying racial prejudice in police search behavior is that it does 
not require KPT to control for other potential explanatory variables: 
the model suggests that an aggregate difference in hit rates for blacks 
and whites determines whether racial animus is present. This is also a 
disadvantage, however, because it translates into unrealistic 
predictions. Specifically, the model implies that all groups of 
individuals, regardless of other characteristics, are equally likely to 
carry drugs on the highway.40 If, for example, black motorists chose to 
carry drugs more often than whites, the police would respond by 
increasing their level of policing blacks, and black motorists would 
respond to the increase by lowering their frequency of carrying drugs. 
In essence, the model predicts that any criminal profile is useless in 
increasing the hit rate of searches.41 Additionally, in differentiating 
between racial animus and rational discrimination, KPT’s model does 
not answer the threshold legal question: do the police engage in racial 
profiling? Instead, KPT seek only to differentiate between types of 
racial profiling—the “good” kind, which is rational and based on 
blacks having an a priori higher payoff to carrying drugs, and the 
“bad” kind, which is irrational, inefficient, and solely based on racial 
animus.42 
 
 37. KPT, supra note 18, at 216. This is an earlier version of the search data I use in Parts II 
and III, although KPT do not use the stop data at all. 
 38. Id. at 228. 
 39. Id. at 219–22. KPT’s analysis does find that Hispanics have a lower hit rate than whites, 
which they conclude is evidence of racial animus against Hispanics. Id. at 222. 
 40. Id. This prediction is a consequence of KPT’s model, in which each driver faces the 
same cost/benefit tradeoff of being caught with drugs versus choosing not to carry drugs.  
Id. at 211. 
 41. Police use of profiles, however, is still helpful in deterring criminal behavior. 
 42. Id. at 205. Economists Kate Antonovics and Brian Knight suggest that this is the legally 
salient question. Kate L. Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: 
Evidence from the Boston Police Department 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 10,634, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W10634. On a practical level, 
Antonovics and Knight may simply be suggesting that causation is difficult to prove in racial 
profiling cases; a rational use of race might, in fact, be a rational use of some unobserved 
characteristic of the motorists that is simply correlated with race. Nonetheless, whether the 
police engage in racial profiling is an important threshold question, as it determines what level 
of scrutiny is applied in an Equal Protection challenge. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
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The KPT model and its extensions43 assume that all troopers act 
in the same way.44 Professors Kate Antonovics and Brian Knight and 
Professors Shamena Anwar and Hanming Fang,45 in contrast, build 
models that explicitly rely on heterogeneous troopers. These authors 
provide a clever strategy, based on the race of the troopers, to 
identify whether racial animus motivates the troopers. They base 
their statistical tests on the simple premise that if discrimination is 
purely rational, all troopers, regardless of the trooper’s race, would 
search black motorists at the same rate.46 Different search rates47 for 
black motorists depending on whether they are stopped by white or 
black troopers are taken as evidence of racial animus. Applying their 
model to data on stops and searches by the Boston police department, 
Professors Antonovics and Knight find evidence of racial animus 
 
326 (2003) (reaffirming that the use of race in government decisionmaking triggers strict 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause). At best, the KPT model is agnostic with respect to 
whether race is an explicit factor in the trooper’s decision to search. 
 43. Several economic studies build on KPT’s work. See, e.g., Vani K. Borooah, Racial Bias 
in Police Stops and Searches: An Economic Analysis, 17 EUR. J. OF POL. ECON. 17, 32–33 (2001) 
(estimating a model similar to KPT’s using data on stops and searches in ten separate areas in 
England); Dhammika Dharmapala & Stephen L. Ross, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicles Searches: 
Additional Theory and Evidence, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, No. 1, art. 
12 (2004), at 4–7, available at http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol3/iss1/art12/ 
(extending KPT to account for the fact that potential offenders can bypass the highway 
altogether, thus avoiding detection); Harcourt, supra note 21, at 1354–71 (mapping out whether 
racial profiling is rational, and which population should be profiled, using a series of potential 
elasticities and offending rate parameters); Rubin Hernandez-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial 
Profiling or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data, 45 INT’L. ECON. REV. 959, 960 
(2004) (extending the KPT model to situations in which aggregate, rather than individual-level 
data, is available); Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Using Hit Rates to Test for Racial Bias in Law 
Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in Wichita 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 10,947, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W10947 (extending the KPT model 
to allow for heterogeneous police and motorists). 
 44. See, e.g., KPT, supra note 18, at 205–06 (assuming that “the police maximize the 
number of successful searches, [and] net the cost of searching motorists”). 
 45. Antonovics & Knight, supra note 42, at 3; Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An 
Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence 3–4 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11,264, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/ 
papers/W11264. 
 46. Antonovics & Knight, supra note 42, at 4; Anwar & Fang, supra note 45, at 6. Because 
identification of their full model is impossible, Antonovics and Knight assume that black and 
white troopers are equally prejudiced. That is, they assume that the difference in search cost of 
black and white motorists is equal, and they compare the white trooper/black motorist search 
rate to the black trooper/white motorist search rate. Antonovics & Knight, supra note 42, at 12. 
 47. Technically, both Professors Anwar and Fang and Professors Antonovics and Knight 
use the search rate for stopped cars, that is, the ratio of the number of vehicles searched to the 
number of vehicles stopped. Antonovics & Knight, supra note 42, at 15–16, 32; Anwar & Fang, 
supra note 45, at 25. 
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against black motorists.48 Professors Anwar and Fang make the same 
basic finding using data from the Florida state police.49 
Taken as a group, these economic models have several flaws. 
First, they assume that the police stop and search vehicles 
differentially on the basis of the race of the driver—that is, that they 
engage in racial profiling. The economic models focus on whether 
doing so is rational. Thus, these economic models cannot answer the 
threshold legal question of whether the police use race in their 
decisionmaking. Second, while aggregation of data allows the 
researchers to estimate the models without controlling for every 
possible legitimate reason to search, the models cannot control for 
different levels of specificity in profiles for blacks and whites.50 If, for 
example, the police have a more accurate profile of black drivers 
because of more information, this would result in a higher hit rate for 
blacks, which could be masking a taste for discrimination.51 One 
possible scenario would be that police obtain information about drug 
couriers by gathering demographic information on drug couriers who 
are in prison. As these drug couriers are disproportionately black, the 
police may have more accurate information regarding the profile of 
black drug couriers as compared with their white counterparts. If, in 
fact, the police do engage in significant racial profiling (as the authors 
of these studies assume), it is logical that they would gain more 
information about black drug possessors than their white 
counterparts, as these are the people they investigate more fully. 
In addition, all of the models discussed to this point focus on hit 
rates as the primary measure of efficiency.52 This translates to 
assuming that the police’s goal is to deter drug use generally, rather 
than drug trafficking more specifically. While multiple goals, 
including the goal of deterring drug use, may be optimal from a policy 
 
 48. Antonovics & Knight, supra note 42, at 19–20. 
 49. Anwar & Fang, supra note 45, at 26. 
 50. Antonovics and Knight, in particular, identify racial animus on the basis of different 
search behavior in cross-race interactions between troopers and motorists, Antonovics & 
Knight, supra note 42, at 12–13, and therefore their results are quite sensitive to this assumption. 
They address this criticism by providing evidence that the troopers do not have a different 
amount of information about cross-race motorists. Id. at 23–24. 
 51. A taste for discrimination, under these models, reduces hit rates because the troopers 
have a lower threshold of suspicion to search black motorists, and therefore will search more 
innocent black motorists. 
 52. KPT do investigate the alternative goal of increasing felony hit rates, but it is not the 
focus of their article. See supra note 36. 
BARNES FIG 2 UPDATE 12-2-05.DOC 12/19/2005  3:01 PM 
1104 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1089 
perspective, the goals may conflict, making them difficult to achieve 
concurrently.53 Finally, the models do not quantify the costs and 
benefits of profiling. 
While not strictly an empirical piece, Professor Harcourt offers a 
theoretical model of racial profiling in his recent article “Rethinking 
Racial Profiling.”54 Based on the assumptions that blacks are 
somewhat more likely to engage in criminal behavior on the highway 
than white motorists, and that their utility of engaging in criminal 
activity is more inelastic—that is, blacks will alter their criminal 
behavior less than whites will when the police change their level of 
searching—Harcourt concludes that racial profiling is likely 
counterproductive in that it leads to a higher crime rate (because the 
ignored group will offend more often) and to more costly searching.55 
Harcourt also discusses what he calls the “ratchet effect,” which is the 
idea that racial profiling has a broader impact on a profiled 
population due to increased fines, incarceration rates, felony 
disenfranchisement, and other similar costs.56 Harcourt does not, 
however, explicitly model the ratchet effect; it is an additional cost 
that is not taken into account in his model, which focuses on 
individual-level costs and benefits. 
Professor Harcourt also argues that the empirical literature’s 
focus on hit rates is misplaced.57 Instead, his model minimizes the 
total social cost of the criminal activity.58 Here, Harcourt is 
particularly concerned with the economists’ rather narrow definition 
of success, based solely on increasing hit rates, rather than actually 
lowering crime rates.59 As his piece is theoretical, however, Harcourt 
provides no insight into how to measure social costs. A broad term 
like “total social cost” suggests that almost any measure is 
incomplete. While I certainly agree that the focus on finding drugs is 
too narrow a definition of success, I doubt that the police are 
 
 53. See infra Part III.E. 
 54. Harcourt, supra note 21, at 1303–06. 
 55. Id. at 1279, 1301–02. 
 56. Id. at 1279–83, 1329–35. 
 57. Id. at 1303–05. 
 58. Id. at 1303. While theoretically possible to incorporate the costs of the ratchet effect 
into the model via the rather amorphous “social cost” of crime, it is clear from Harcourt’s 
exposition that this is not his intent. Similarly, Harcourt does not question whether there are 
more efficient ways to discourage drug trafficking than by searching vehicles on the highway, 
which deters only drug trafficking on the highway. 
 59. Id. at 1276–77. 
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farsighted enough to have considered minimizing total social cost as a 
goal, rather than something more short term and easily measurable, 
like maximizing the amount of drugs seized.60 
While Professor Harcourt’s economic model is an advance, he 
does not question the initial assumption that the police engage in 
racial profiling. Thus, like the rest of the economic models, his cannot 
answer the initial question whether the police use race as a factor in 
deciding whom to search. Nor can his model, or the other economic 
models described above, quantify the harm or benefit from racial 
profiling; they simply determine whether it is economically efficient61 
or the product of racial animus. This provides an incomplete picture 
of the costs and benefits of racial profiling. 
None of the empirical investigations discussed above explicitly 
determines the factors that influence the decision to search a stopped 
vehicle or simultaneously controls for nonracial factors that may 
influence the decision to search. Without such a model, the 
investigators must make assumptions about the underlying crime rate 
that may not be borne out by the data. Most importantly, the studies 
assume that the base drug-possession rates for blacks and whites are 
similar. The authors, myself included, provide empirical data to 
suggest that these assumptions are reasonable, but we do not prove 
the assumptions correct. 
Why has this prior work largely failed to model the decision to 
search explicitly? One simple reason: lack of data.62 In order to 
estimate a model of the decision to search, one needs detailed 
individual-level data on the motorists searched, and, more 
importantly, on the motorists who are not searched. 
 
 60. For example, commendations and promotions may well be tied to high-profile drug 
busts. In addition, individual police departments will not necessarily take total social cost into 
account; they may simply work to keep the criminal activity out of their neighborhood. The 
neighborhood is, after all, their constituency. 
 61. As narrowly defined, economic efficiency simply balances the direct cost to searching, 
in terms of the trooper’s time, against the direct benefit of searching, in terms of the amount of 
drugs seized. But cf. Harcourt, supra note 21, at 1300 (arguing that economists define efficiency 
too narrowly in the context of the criminal justice system). 
 62. Data collection has become a focus of antiracial profiling efforts over the past several 
years. See, e.g., DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING 
DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS: PROMISING PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED (2000), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/184768.pdf. For an up-to-date list of jurisdictions 
that track at least some information related to racial profiling, see the Racial Profiling Data 
Collection Resource Center at the Northeastern University website, http:// 
www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu. 
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One group of investigators does have individual-level data of 
stops, including information on who was searched, and whether 
contraband was found.63 Professor Nicholas Lovrich and his coauthors 
use data on 677,514 traffic stops in Washington State from March 
2002 to October 2002.64 They estimate several decision models, 
including the decision to search.65 While cautioning that their study is 
not completed and results are somewhat preliminary, they find that 
race plays a role in the decision to search, even after controlling for 
such other factors as seriousness of the violation, sex of the driver, the 
officer’s race and sex, the officer’s experience, time of day, and 
location.66 
The empirical analysis conducted by Professor Lovrich and his 
colleagues is a large step forward. They provide the first systematic 
model of the decision to search a stopped vehicle and find that race is 
an important factor in the decision. They do not, however, quantify 
the gains from that decision, nor can they with the data set they 
describe. Because they do not have information on what was found in 
the search, they are limited to modeling whether a search occurred, 
rather than more broadly modeling the gains from searching. In order 
to discuss the policy implications of racial profiling, however, it is 
critical not only to determine whether the police use racial profiling, 
but also to quantify the costs and benefits. Both the civil rights 
empiricists, in focusing on the first question, and the economists, in 
focusing on a limited version of the second question, have failed to 
 
 63. NICHOLAS LOVRICH ET AL., WSP TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS PROJECT 39–111 
(June 1, 2003), available at http://www.wsp.wa.gov/reports/wsptraff.pdf. Professors Antonovics 
and Knight also explicitly model the decision to search using individual-level data. See 
Antonovics & Knight, supra note 41, at 15–16. Their model, however, does not control for other 
important variables beyond the race of the trooper and the race of the motorist because they do 
not have the detailed data necessary to do so. Their model is therefore significantly 
underspecified. 
 64. LOVRICH ET AL., supra note 63, at 93. 
 65. Id. at 107–08. 
 66. Id. at 109–10. They also control for the level of discretion in the search and find that 
race has the same effect in low-discretion searches (searches incident to arrest, impound 
searches, and warrant searches) as in high-discretion searches (consent searches, Terry searches, 
and K-9 searches). They find this inconsistent with the premise of racial profiling, which would 
suggest that more discretion allows race to play a greater role in the decisionmaking process. As 
the authors also believe this to be inconsistent with prior literature on discretionary searches, 
they posit that they have not controlled for all the factors that are driving the decision to search. 
Id. It is worth noting that this prior literature is based upon the intuition of many commentators, 
rather than empirical fact. 
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integrate these two fundamental questions and therefore have failed 
to provide a complete response to these questions. 
In sum, while all of the prior literature on racial profiling has 
contributed to society’s empirical knowledge of racial profiling in the 
context of drug interdiction, the authors have not quantified the costs 
and benefits of racial profiling. The primary difficulty with 
quantifying the costs and benefits is lack of data: what data is 
available contains information on the people that the police thought 
were worthy of investigation, rather than all motorists on the 
highway. Chances are, the nice little old lady next door is not going to 
arouse suspicion. But, she may be the person who carries a large 
quantity of drugs on her trip down to Florida. Or, to return to the 
example of the Japanese American internment during WWII, how 
many English American spies did the police overlook because they 
concentrated only on Japanese Americans? Looking for the wrong 
people—or more generally, for only a select subset of people—biases 
the data. Empiricists call this particular type of bias “selection bias” 
because it is created when data are collected on a subpopulation that 
was selected nonrandomly. 
Unlike prior empirical work, I am able to control for selection 
bias and to quantify the costs and benefits of racial profiling. To do 
this, I use an empirical model called the “Heckman selection model” 
with a combined data set of searches and stops on the highway.67 The 
first step in implementing the Heckman selection model is to 
determine how drivers are selected for searching; that is, to build a 
mathematical model that determines the police decisions to search 
stopped vehicles. In this Article, I do this with data from the MSP. 
II.  THE DECISION TO SEARCH 
I model the average trooper’s decisionmaking strategy by 
estimating the probability that a trooper will search a stopped vehicle 
with a given set of characteristics.68 The model I build relies on data 
collected on all vehicles stopped by the MSP on a section of I-95. 
Thus, the universe of individuals included in my dataset is all stopped 
 
 67. For further discussion of the Heckman selection model, see infra notes 109 & 111 and 
accompanying text. 
 68. I use a probit model to estimate the probability pi that a car with characteristics Xi will 
be searched. The probit model estimates a model of the form: ( ) bii Xp =Y -1  where b  is the 
vector of estimated coefficients that determine the effect of each iX  on ip  and ()•Y -1  is the 
inverse cumulative distribution function of the Normal distribution. 
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vehicles, rather than all motorists driving down the highway. Of 
course, that set of data is not completely unbiased, because the 
decision to stop a vehicle driving down the highway is also not 
completely random; it is, however, likely a more random process with 
respect to race and the likelihood of drug possession than the decision 
to search, as the police have very limited information about a vehicle 
when they decide to stop it. The police might know the race of the 
driver—indeed, stereotypical racial profiling involves troopers who 
angle their cars to see into vehicle interiors before pulling behind a 
vehicle and stopping it—but if the police are more likely to stop black 
motorists, this would tend to bias the estimated search probabilities 
for blacks downward.69 
Before describing the specific modeling choices, let me first 
provide a brief description of the datasets that I use to estimate the 
model.70 I use data on stops and searches on a portion of I-95 in 
Maryland. The search dataset and stop dataset are separate, 
generated in response to two related lawsuits charging the MSP with 
using racial profiling in traffic stops and searches on the highway.71 
The search dataset is the product of a consent decree in a federal civil 
rights class action against the MSP.72 The search dataset contains all 
searches of vehicles in Maryland by the MSP from January 1995 to 
December 2003.73 The information available for each search includes 
the grounds the MSP used to justify the search (probable cause or 
consent); the reasons the MSP asked for consent or believed they had 
probable cause; characteristics of the car (such as make, model, state 
of registration, and model year); characteristics of the driver (such as 
race and sex); date and time of stop; as well as what was found during 
the search (quantity and type of drugs, guns, and money). There are 
approximately 15,000 searches in the dataset. 
 
 69. That is, if one assumes that stops are random events, and further assumes that the 
relative search rates of stopped vehicles across race are equal, one would underestimate the 
overall differential search rate for blacks if blacks were profiled at both stages of the process. 
For a discussion of the salience of the empirical difference between stopped vehicles and all 
vehicles on the highway, see infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 70. The dataset is available at http://law.wustl.edu/Academics/Faculty/Barnes/index.html. 
 71. Wilkins v. Md. State Police, No. CCB-93-468 (D. Md. filed 1993) (settled by consent 
decree in 2003). Its companion case was filed in 1998. NAACP v. Md. Dep’t of State Police, No. 
CCB-98-1098 (D. Md. filed Apr. 10, 1998) (settled by same consent decree in 2003). 
 72. Wilkins, No. CCB-93-468. 
 73. Although the search dataset contains information on all searches throughout Maryland, 
I use only the searches on a portion of I-95, in order to match the search dataset to the 
geographically limited stops dataset. 
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The dataset on stops arose out of concerns that the MSP were 
not creating a complete dataset of searches. At that point, the 
litigation had focused primarily on one group of MSP: those assigned 
to the JFK Barracks.74 This dataset records every stop on the 49.5-
mile stretch of I-95 north of Baltimore to the Delaware state line that 
defines the jurisdiction of the JFK Barracks. The stops data begin in 
May 1997 and record the location, date, and time of the stop; the 
make of the car; any traffic code violation; whether a ticket, warning, 
or safety violation was issued; and the race and sex of the driver. In a 
subset of the cases, the data also record the posted speed limit and the 
speed of the vehicle. There are 199,409 stops in the dataset from May 
1, 1997, to December 31, 2003. Narrowing the search dataset to the 
time period and geographic area covered by the stop dataset yields 
2,583 traffic stops for which search data are also available.75 
Although stops are far more likely than searches to be conducted 
randomly with respect to race and the likelihood of drug possession, 
as I mention above, there is still a possibility of some bias. If black 
 
 74. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Enforcement of Settlement 
Agreement and for Further Relief, Wilkins v. Md. State Police (D. Md. 1997) (Civil Action No. 
CCB-93-468), at Parts III–IV (arguing that the I-95 corridor and MSP troop numbers 62 (the 
JFK Barracks) and 55 conduct the vast majority of searches) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal); Order, Wilkins v. Md. State Police (D. Md. Apr. 22, 1997) (Civil Action No. CCB-
468), ¶ 1 (finding a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in vehicle searches on the I-95 
corridor) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also Elliott Wolf, ACLU, The Use of Racial 
Profiling by the Maryland State Police in Drug Interdiction from 1995–2002, at 2–3 (discussing 
stop and search patterns of the JFK Barracks) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 75. For the purposes of this study, the primary problem with the stops and searches 
databases maintained by the MSP is that the two datasets are not linked. Thus, there is no 
variable in the stops data that indicates whether a search was conducted, or what that search 
found. One large data project has been the matching of searches to stops based on the time, 
location, direction of travel, trooper, vehicle make, and race and sex of the driver. In order to 
match a search to a particular stop, I require that the search occur within two hours of the stop, 
that the direction of travel match, if available in both datasets, and that the location of the stop 
be within five miles of the location of the search (to account for variations in data collection). In 
addition, I match searches based on four additional factors: make of vehicle, name of trooper, 
race of driver, and sex of driver. I use the order of this list as a tiebreaker. Thus, if two different 
stops match three criteria for the same search, the stop that matches all but the sex of the driver 
is preferred to the stop that matches all but the race of the driver, etc. With this rather stringent 
algorithm, I am able to match 1,248 of 2,583 total searches, or 48.3 percent of the searches on I-
95 during the appropriate time period. Stop data from July 1, 2002, through December 31, 2003, 
did not contain the time of the stop; for this subset of data, stops were matched by date and the 
above criteria. For the stops and searches before July 1, 2002, when time data was available, 931 
of 1486 searches were matched, for a match rate of 62.6 percent. For all of the data, under the 
assumption that the search data is more accurate, if the data sets diverge on control variables, I 
use the search data for any value that does not match the stop data. 
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drivers are more likely to be stopped for a given traffic violation than 
white drivers, evidence of bias at the search level will be attenuated. 
If white drivers are more likely to be stopped, the situation would be 
reversed, but a white bias in stops is unlikely.76 
A. Model Specification 
The primary question I address is whether race is a part of the 
profile the MSP use in determining whether to search a stopped 
vehicle. To analyze this question, I use a regression-based model that 
incorporates a variety of independent variables, including the driver’s 
race. Other independent variables both control for alternate reasons 
for the search and describe more accurately the decision to search 
overall. I discuss the variables of interest below. 
1. Characteristics of the Driver.  The aggregate I-95 data reveal 
that men were driving a majority of the cars stopped by the MSP. This 
disparity grows with respect to searches: 73.6 percent of vehicles 
searched had male drivers. Received wisdom suggests that men—in 
particular young men—are more likely than women to be carrying 
drugs. Thus, driver gender may be a part of the trooper’s profile, and 
I include the driver’s sex as an independent variable to control for this 
possibility.77 In addition, race and sex may interact in important ways. 
For example, black men may be more likely than white men to carry 
drugs, but black women may not be more likely to carry drugs than 
white women. Because of this possibility, I include variables that 
capture the interaction of sex and race. 
2. Characteristics of the Vehicle.  I also include the make and 
age of the vehicle as independent variables. To capture the effects of 
the vehicle’s make, I include binary variables representing the two 
categories of vehicles considered to have an innately higher 
 
 76. For example, evidence suggests that blacks are slightly more likely to speed than 
whites, making a white bias less likely. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 664, 687–88. 
 77. I do not have data for two particular characteristics of the driver, age and income, and 
therefore cannot control directly for either. I control for the driver’s income indirectly through 
the make and age of the vehicle driven. I do not have a proxy for age in the data, however, so I 
cannot control for that variable. As blacks and Hispanics are, on average, younger populations 
than are whites, if MSP select younger drivers for search more often, this could be masked as a 
selection on the basis of race. 
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likelihood of search: luxury cars78 and large commercial trucks.79 
These variables capture the typical example of racial profiling—
young black men driving expensive cars—and the possibility that 
professional truck drivers have a higher tendency to be searched. In 
controlling for the vehicle’s age, I include a variable to capture 
whether it is an older model (ten or more years old).80 I do not include 
a variable for the color of the car because of insufficient data, 
although trooper lore suggests that black or red cars are searched 
more often.81 
Finally, I use a series of regional variables to control for the state 
in which the vehicle is registered. I break the states up into several 
groups representing different regions along I-95, the major north-
south highway on the East Coast, and the rest of the country. The 
specific groups are Maryland, Eastern states north of Maryland 
(excluding New York), New York, Eastern states south of the District 
of Columbia, the District of Columbia, and the rest of the country.82 It 
is important to control for region because the Federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) created a profile in the early 
1990s suggesting that drugs traveled south from New York City to the 
Baltimore/D.C. metropolitan area, while cash traveled north from 
Baltimore to New York.83 Whether or not the DEA profile is 
accurate, the state of origin will influence a trooper’s decision to 
search if that decision is based upon the DEA profile. More 
 
 78. Luxury models include Acura, Audi, Bentley, BMW, Cadillac, Hummer, Infiniti, 
Jaguar, Land Rover, Lexus, Lincoln, Mercedes, Porsche, Range Rover, Rolls Royce, Saab, 
Sterling, and Volvo. 
 79. Large trucks include International, Mack, Peterbilt, and Kenworth trucks. 
 80. I experimented with different definitions of “older car”; none made a substantive 
change in the results of the model. 
 81. There is, for example, a widely held belief that red cars cost more to insure because 
their drivers are, on average, more reckless. See CarInsurance.com, FAQs, 
http://www.carinsurance.com/kb/content10059.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (dispelling this 
myth). 
 82. In the tables that follow, I denote these categories as Maryland Plates, Northeast 
Plates, New York Plates, Southeast Plates, DC Plates, and Non-East Coast Plates, respectively. 
 83. David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues That the U.S. Wrote the Book on Race 
Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at A1; see also United States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 869, 875 
(11th Cir. 1988) (discussing a DEA course that taught Georgia officers that “drug couriers are 
frequently Hispanics”); United States v. Layman, 730 F. Supp. 332, 334, 337 (D. Colo. 1990) 
(noting that officers were trained by DEA agents to use drug courier profiles that included race 
as a factor); TASK FORCE ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, OPERATION PIPELINE REPORT (1999), 
available at http://www.aclunc.org/discrimination/webb-report.html (noting the California 
Highway Patrol’s use of racial profiling as part of the DEA’s “Operation Pipeline” protocol). 
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generally, troopers may believe that individuals traveling from 
specific regions may be more or less likely to carry drugs, and 
therefore they may search vehicles from those regions more or less 
often. 
3. Characteristics of the Encounter.  A typical explanation for 
the higher percentage of blacks being stopped and searched is that 
blacks drive differently,84 the implication being that individuals who 
drive less safely are more likely to possess drugs.85 I control for this 
potential explanation by including several variables capturing the 
violation upon which the stop was based. The two primary violations 
were speeding (65.8 percent of the stops) and seatbelt violations (16.6 
percent of the stops). Two other violations were registration 
infractions such as missing or expired registration or tags (3.8 percent 
of the stops) and broken or missing lights (1.6 percent of the stops).86 
Finally, while an infrequent violation, I control for driving while 
intoxicated (DWI) (about 0.8 percent of the stops). The dataset also 
provides information regarding whether a ticket, warning, or safety 
violation was issued, so I use variables to capture those outcomes as 
well. Because of the small number of safety violations, I include them 
with warnings and look only at whether a ticket was issued. In some 
specifications, I also include a variable that controls for driving at 
night, defined as between 9:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m., because troopers 
may be more likely to search late at night, both for logistical reasons 
and because traveling late may be correlated with criminal activity. 
Data on time of day are missing for all stops after June 30, 2002; for 
this reason, all models that use nighttime as an independent variable 
must drop all the data from July 1, 2002, through December 31, 2003, 
a total of almost 50,000 stops.87 
I include a variable to capture the direction of travel because of 
the DEA profile, mentioned above, that suggests that drugs travel 
south on I-95 from New York City to Baltimore. Again, whether or 
 
 84. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 687–88 (discussing this possibility). 
 85. Blacks may be more likely to be stopped because of unsafe driving, but unless unsafe 
driving is positively correlated with drug possession, there is no reason to search unsafe drivers 
disproportionately more often. 
 86. Many of the stops include more than one violation. 
 87. The models I report in Tables 1–2 and 4–8 infra are estimated using the full dataset  
and drop nighttime as an independent variable. I indicate in footnotes when the alternative 
model—including nighttime as a variable but excluding stops and searches made after June 30, 
2002—provides different results. 
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not the DEA profile is accurate, if the troopers rely on the profile, the 
direction of travel should influence a police officer’s decision to 
search. Finally, I also include indicator variables for all police officers 
performing more than one hundred stops during the time period of 
the study, May 1, 1997, to December 31, 2003, because troopers may 
set significantly different thresholds for the probability of finding 
drugs above which they will search a vehicle.88 
B. Results: The MSP’s Search Profile 
The results from a model with these independent variables 
demonstrate that the driver’s race is the most salient factor in a 
trooper’s decision to search a stopped vehicle. I focus on consent 
searches because they arguably allow more discretion on the part of 
the police officer.89 Nonconsent searches are based on a wide range of 
circumstances—including a vehicle search incident, an arrest, and an 
officer noticing the odor of marijuana when approaching a vehicle. 
While the individual MSP officers still have discretion to ignore the 
marijuana odor, nonconsent searches do not provide information 
about racial profiling as I define it. Because the troopers have 
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, the issue is 
one of selective enforcement of the laws, rather than an a priori belief 
that blacks and Hispanics are more likely to commit a crime. Table 1 
provides the details of the results from this model. Black drivers who 
are stopped face a 0.80 percent search rate—2.6 times higher than the 
0.31 percent probability of search faced by otherwise-similar white 
drivers. Hispanics fair worse. They are searched 3.5 times more often 
than whites. This is the effect of race after controlling for other 
relevant variables and is statistically significant with p-values for the 
black and Hispanic variables of less than 0.0005.90 The most likely 
 
 88. Out of the 240 troopers who stopped more than 100 vehicles, 20 of the troopers never 
conducted a search. Thus, variables for these 20 troopers perfectly predict no search (or a 
probability of searching equal to zero). I therefore drop the stops by these troopers from the 
model, as they provide no further explanatory power. A total of 14,781 stops were dropped from 
the full dataset for this reason. 
 89. But see LOVRICH ET AL., supra note 63, at 107–10 (describing potential means by which 
“non-discretionary” searches may still allow room for discretionary decisionmaking). 
 90. A p-value represents the probability that a result as extreme or more extreme would 
occur when there was, in fact, no relationship between the independent variable and the 
decision to search. For example, in this case, the p-value of less than 0.0005 represents the 
probability that after controlling for other relevant variables, the estimated difference in search 
rates between blacks and whites would be as great or greater if there were no relationship 
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explanation for this is that the MSP engaged in large-scale racial 
profiling.91 
In addition, female drivers who have been stopped are far less 
likely to have their vehicles searched than male drivers. The 
interaction between race and sex is also significant, which means that 
the difference in search rates between men and women changes 
depending on the race of the men and women compared. Overall, 
Hispanic male drivers are the most likely to be searched and are 7.4 
times more likely to be searched than white women, even after 
controlling for vehicle characteristics and the particular characteristics 
of the encounter. Black men are 5.5 times more likely to be searched 
than white women. The MSP’s target in searching is clearly black and 
Hispanic men. 
Beyond the primary findings that race is the most salient factor 
in the MSP’s profile and that black and Hispanic men are the primary 
target of the MSP, there are several other interesting findings. 
Vehicles from Washington, D.C., and non-East Coast states are 
slightly more than 1.5 times as likely to be searched as vehicles from 
Maryland; this difference is statistically significant at the 0.0005 level. 
Vehicles registered in New York are slightly more likely to be 
searched, with a relative risk92 of 1.21. As the data does not provide 
more specific information than state of registration, it may be that 
those searched are disproportionately from New York City in 
particular, but I cannot determine this. Those searched are, however, 
disproportionately from Washington, D.C., non-East Coast states, 
and, to a lesser extent, from New York. 
 
between race and the decision to search. A coefficient with a p-value of 0.05 or less is generally 
described as statistically significant. 
 91. If a very powerful independent variable that is highly correlated with race were omitted 
from the model, the conclusion of racial profiling would be invalid. But this is very unlikely, 
especially when race is a stronger predictor of searches than variables that are part of the 
DEA’s drug interdiction profile. 
 92. The relative risk of a search is the additional risk faced by a driver with a specific 
characteristic, expressed as a ratio, compared to the baseline of a white male motorist driving a 
newer car with Maryland plates who did not get a ticket. For each variable, the relative risk is 
given by: 
Pr (Search given variable (e.g., black)) 
Pr (Search given baseline) 
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TABLE 1.  DETERMINANTS OF THE DECISION TO SEARCH 
Variable Relative Risk P-Value 
Baseline 1.00 N/A 
Race/Sex of Driver93(Control: White Male)   
Black Male 2.59   0.00094 
Hispanic Male 3.48 0.000 
White Female 0.47 0.004 
Black Female 0.68 0.601 
Hispanic Female 1.26 0.001 
Luxury Vehicle/White Driver 0.51 0.005 
Luxury Vehicle/Black Driver 2.73 0.057 
Luxury Vehicle/Hispanic Driver 5.11 0.177 
State of Origin (Control: Maryland Plates)   
Northeast Plates 1.15 0.171 
New York Plates 1.21 0.000 
Southeast Plates 1.70 0.167 
DC Plates 1.53 0.000 
Non-East Coast Plates 1.71 0.000 
Seatbelt Violation 0.40 0.112 
DWI Violation 0.82 0.489 
Registration Violation 0.85 0.268 
Lights Violation 0.82 0.659 
Speeding Violation 0.89 0.117 
Traveling South 1.12 0.632 
Ticket Issued 0.96 0.001 
Older Vehicle 1.32 0.000 
 
 93. In the standard statistical practice, these variables are not interaction terms, but instead 
are dummy variables for each demographic group, comparing the group (Hispanic women, for 
example) against white men. This is equivalent to the standard statistical practice of using 
“interaction” terms, in which a variable labeled “Hispanic X female” would estimate whether 
the difference in search rates between Hispanic men and women was the same as the difference 
in search rates between white men and women. I report dummy variables in the tables to make 
the demographic differences more transparent. Other relative risks may be found by division:  
Relative Risk of Variable A 
Relative Risk of Variable A to Variable B = 
Relative Risk of Variable B.  
Thus, for example, the relative risk of a Hispanic man being searched as compared to a white 
woman is: 3.48 / 0.47 = 7.4. 
 94. A p-value of 0.000 simply means that the true p-value is less than 0.0005; rounded to 
three significant digits, this is 0.000. 
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Turning to the effect of different predicate violations on the 
decision to search, only one variable predicts whether a consent 
search occurs: if a ticket is issued, a driver is slightly less likely to be 
searched. While small differences are often statistically significant in 
such large datasets, the relative risk of 0.96 is sufficiently close to 1 to 
be of little practical significance. Other violations are not statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level.95 
The type of vehicle stopped also impacts the likelihood of a 
search. Older vehicles are 1.32 times more likely to be searched than 
other vehicles. Luxury vehicles driven by white motorists are 
significantly less likely to be searched; white motorists stopped in 
luxury vehicles are about half as likely to be searched as similar 
motorists in nonluxury cars. The benefit of driving luxury vehicles 
disappears, however, for black motorists. Overall, black motorists 
driving luxury cars are 2.7 times as likely to be stopped as white 
motorists driving nonluxury cars. This effect is marginally statistically 
significant, with a p-value of 0.057.96 As compared to black motorists 
in nonluxury vehicles, black motorists stopped in luxury cars are 
equally likely to be searched (relative risk of 1.03). As compared to 
white motorists in luxury cars, black motorists in luxury cars are 5.4 
times more likely to be searched if stopped. This difference is 
significant at the 5 percent level. No other vehicle characteristic is 
statistically significant, suggesting that the MSP do not rely on these 
traits in their decisions to search stopped vehicles. 
Although not listed in Table 1, several individual troopers have 
search rates significantly different from the average, ranging from a 
search rate of 0 percent (zero searches out of 3,319 stops) to a search 
rate of 10.3 percent (111 searches out of 1,079 stops); the average 
search rate is 0.6 percent. Despite the DEA profile, southbound 
 
 95. In the alternative model that includes nonconsent searches and controls for these 
probable cause searches, whether a vehicle was speeding is a statistically significant predictor of 
a search. Specifically, speeders are less likely to be searched, with a relative risk of 0.40. This 
implies that nonconsent searches are disproportionately nonspeeders (or, conversely, consent 
searches are disproportionately performed on speeders) and therefore may suggest that 
speeding is being used as a pretext for stops. 
 96. Very few Hispanic motorists were stopped driving luxury vehicles; only 275 Hispanic 
drivers driving luxury vehicles were stopped, as compared with over 14,000 whites and 7,000 
blacks. With such a small amount of data, the coefficient for Hispanic motorists driving luxury 
vehicles is not statistically significant. Based upon the magnitude and direction of the estimated 
effect—Hispanic motorists in luxury cars are over ten times as likely to be searched after being 
stopped than their white counterparts—the same pattern may hold, but without more data, it is 
impossible to determine whether this is the case. 
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motorists are not more likely to be searched, at least after controlling 
for other relevant variables. Looking more closely, however, it 
appears that the trooper fixed effects may be masking a southbound 
effect; several troopers only search southbound vehicles. Because of 
the trooper fixed effects, the southbound searches for these troopers 
provide no additional information with which the model can identify 
the southbound variable. Essentially, to the model, these searches do 
not matter. In a model without trooper fixed effects, southbound 
drivers are 1.25 times as likely to be searched.97 
In sum, the MSP determine which stopped vehicles to search on 
the basis of their personal threshold for searching and the race and 
sex of the driver, with black and Hispanic men being searched most 
often. The other factors in the troopers’ profile include traveling 
southbound and driving an older vehicle registered in the southeast or 
in non-East Coast states. 
To make the multivariate nature of the predictions more 
transparent, Table 2 provides a list of potential drivers on the 
highway and their individual probabilities of being searched, based on 
a given set of characteristics. 
 
 97. This is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.003. 
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TABLE 2.  SEARCH PROBABILITIES FOR  
DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS 
Driver Description98 Pr(Search) Relative Risk 
White male from Maryland in newer car, 
traveling north 
.31% 1 
Black male from D.C. in newer luxury car, 
traveling south 
.93% 3.0 
Hispanic male from New York in older luxury 
car, traveling south 
2.30% 7.5 
White female from New York in older car, 
traveling south 
.24% 0.8 
Black female from southeastern U.S. in newer 
car, traveling north 
.36% 1.2 
Hispanic female from northeastern U.S. in older 
car, traveling north 
.58% 1.9 
White male from non-East Coast state in  
newer luxury car, traveling north 
.28% 0.9 
Black male from southeastern U.S. in older 
luxury car, traveling south 
1.88% 6.1 
White male from non-East Coast state in  
older car, traveling south 
.53% 1.7 
Hispanic male from non-East Coast state in 
older car, traveling south 
3.28% 10.7 
Table 2 demonstrates that the MSP focus the bulk of their 
attention on black and Hispanic motorists. As compared to white 
men stopped in newer, nonluxury vehicles from Maryland traveling 
northbound during the day, black and Hispanic motorists, depending 
on the other characteristics, are 1.2 to 10.7 times more likely to be 
searched. The category of driver facing the highest overall probability 
of being searched is a black male motorist from a non-East Coast 
state, stopped in an older luxury car, traveling southbound. This is the 
strongest version of the MSP’s profile and confirms that the MSP 
engage in racial profiling. The driver’s race is clearly one element of a 
trooper’s decision to search a stopped vehicle. 
 
 98. The estimates provided in this table hold all other variables constant at their medians 
(the baseline value). 
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III.  QUANTIFYING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PROFILES 
Having determined which motorists, once stopped, face the 
highest likelihoods of being searched by the MSP, I turn to the second 
empirical project of this Article: quantifying the costs and benefits of 
the MSP’s use of racial profiling. What does engaging in racial 
profiling gain the MSP? One justification is that the MSP find more 
drugs because they focus on black and Hispanic motorists.99 This Part 
estimates a model that determines what the gains to racial profiling 
are in terms of drug users and couriers arrested and total drugs 
seized.100 Along the way, the model also quantifies one direct cost of 
racial profiling: the number of innocent motorists searched.101 
Why quantify the benefits of racial profiling? Critics of racial 
profiling argue that such quantification serves little good; even if 
blacks carry drugs more often, or are more likely to be drug couriers 
than whites, the gains from using race in a search profile are 
minimal.102 After all, drug interdiction on the highway involves 
picking the drivers most likely to be carrying drugs out of hundreds of 
thousands of motorists each day. It is an (almost) futile exercise. How 
could profiling based upon a broad measure that cuts across many 
other salient demographics be significantly beneficial? On the flip 
side, if drug interdiction on the highway is so difficult, why should the 
police not be allowed to use race if, in fact, it works? A first look at 
the data suggests that racial profiling may be advantageous, but it also 
suggests a high cost, in terms of greater numbers of innocent 
motorists searched. 
 
 99. See, e.g., Mac Donald, Myth of Racial Profiling, supra note 17, at 20 (arguing that racial 
profiling increases the amount of drugs seized). 
 100. The cut points determining the boundaries between “user” and “courier” are based on 
government estimates of the average prices and the amounts spent by users of various 
contraband drugs in 1998. See WILLIAM RHODES ET AL., OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL POLICY, WHAT AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS 1988–1998, at 12, 16, 
22–23 (2000). The cut points were chosen to balance the cost versus weight for different drugs. 
For marijuana, the cut point is 455g = $5,120 or five years’ supply. For crack and powder 
cocaine, the cut point is 50g = $7,450 or about nine months’ supply. For heroin, the cut point is 
10g = $10,290 or about eleven months’ supply. Finally, for other drugs, the amounts were 
recoded, very roughly, into dosage units; a cut point of 150 dosage units defines a drug courier. 
See Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 696 n.152, for further details. 
 101. I recognize that this is not a complete measure of the costs of racial profiling, even on 
an individual level. Other costs, not easily quantified, include the loss of dignity, the stigma of 
being searched, and the deterioration of police-citizen relationships in minority communities. 
 102. See HARRIS, supra note 16, at 84–86 (noting that in “stops and searches,” police rarely 
find evidence of crime); Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 750–52. 
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A. An Initial Look at the Data (and Why It Is Misleading) 
Table 3 presents the frequency distribution of the amount of 
crack and powder cocaine seized by the MSP, by race. Eighty-three 
percent of the drivers found with larger amounts (over 50 grams) of 
these drugs are black or Hispanic (25 out of 29). This table makes 
clear why police have a greater tendency to search cars driven by 
blacks and Hispanics: that is where the drugs are.103 
TABLE 3.  NUMBER OF SEARCHES FINDING  
CRACK AND POWDER COCAINE, BY QUANTITY 
Quantity # White Drivers # Minority Drivers Total 
None 523 654 1177 
Trace–50 grams 17 26 43 
50–100 grams 0 3 3 
100–500 grams 2 10 12 
500–1,000 grams 0 5 5 
Over 1,000 grams 2 7 9 
Total 544 705 1,249 
Or is it? Recall that the search data I have are not a random 
sample of drivers on the highway; nor are they a random sample of 
drivers who were stopped by the MSP.104 Instead, the data are a 
sample of those individuals, already stopped for some reason, whom 
the MSP believed were most likely to be carrying drugs. From Part 
II.B, we know that these individuals are not a random sample of the 
population. Indeed, those searched are disproportionately black and 
Hispanic men who are traveling south in older cars. Without 
controlling for this selection bias, there is no way of confirming that 
the police are using the right profile. It may be that white drug 
couriers are driving on I-95 as well, but because they do not fit the 
MSP’s profile, they do not get searched. The MSP would have no idea 
that these white drug couriers were driving on the highway or being 
stopped and not searched. The data would seem to confirm that the 
MSP were doing their job: arresting the drug couriers. To the MSP, it 
 
 103. Or, at least, where crack and powder cocaine are. The pattern is similar if one looks at 
all drugs. Thirty-nine out of forty-nine drivers found with large amounts of drugs are black or 
Hispanic. 
 104. See supra p. 1107 for the discussion of selection bias inherent in the dataset. 
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would just be an unfortunate fact of life that drug couriers are almost 
all black or Hispanic.105 The models I introduce below in Parts III.B, 
C, and D control for this selection bias and allow me to discover if the 
MSP’s perceptions of reality based on the searches they conduct are 
accurate, or if they are missing an entire subgroup of drug traffickers 
because of a poor search profile. 
Figure 1 provides a different perspective on the search data, this 
time using data on all drugs, rather than just crack and powder 
cocaine, by presenting the number of searches finding no drugs 
(innocent drivers), some drugs (drivers who are drug users), and large 
amounts of drugs (drivers who are drug traffickers).106 Figure 1 makes 
clear that, while minority drivers comprise a larger percentage of the 
drug dealers, there is a high cost to searching more minorities: 
because innocent drivers are more likely to be black or Hispanic, 
more innocent drivers will be searched when the MSP engage in 
racial profiling. 
FIGURE 1.  TYPES OF DRIVERS BY MINORITY STATUS 
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 105. Cf. Kathy Barrett Carter & Ron Marsico, Whitman Fires Chief of State Police, STAR 
LEDGER (New Jersey), Mar. 1, 1999, at 1A (providing an example of comments by the chief of 
the New Jersey State Police on the racial stratification of drug trafficking); C.J. Chivers,  
Ex-Police Leader’s Claim of Bias Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at B4 (noting that other 
documents also describe drug trafficking along racial lines). 
 106. I define the threshold amount of drugs to be considered a drug courier by reference to 
government estimates. See supra note 100. These thresholds are based upon a combination of 
street price and number of dosage units. Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 696 n.152. 
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Or does it? What if the MSP are just more discerning when they 
choose to search a vehicle driven by a white person? If they require a 
higher threshold of suspicion before subjecting whites to a search, 
they would search fewer innocent whites, and greater numbers of 
innocent blacks and Hispanics.107  
Again, because of selection bias, this data does not show that 
minorities are more often innocent of drug crimes; instead, it shows 
that in the population of drivers searched, minorities accounted for 
two-thirds of the innocent drivers searched. It may be that blacks are 
less likely to carry drugs on the highway, but these data do not show 
this directly because the data have not been corrected for selection 
bias. 
Figure 2 illustrates the problem of selection bias graphically. For 
ease of discussion, the three groups in Figure 1—innocents, users, and 
couriers—are collapsed into two categories: innocent motorists and 
motorists carrying drugs. Panel A provides a graph of the search data 
actually observed. Note that there are slightly more guilty minority 
motorists in the data, suggesting that racial profiling has some 
benefits. Panel B adds hypothetical data of motorists who were 
stopped but not searched. The hypothetical data are represented by 
hatch marks; they are reasonable if the troopers do engage in racial 
profiling, meaning that they search vehicles driven by minorities 
stopped on the highway at much higher rates.108 Panel C simply shades 
in the hypothetical data, illustrating that the underlying guilt rate is 
the same for both groups—minorities and whites in stopped vehicles 
are carrying drugs about 25 percent of the time, and the relative 
percentages of white and minority motorists stopped on the highway 
are 75 percent and 25 percent, respectively. The white motorists, 
however, are searched at a much lower rate; they drive down the 
highway carrying drugs with little chance of being caught, even if a 
trooper stops them. Minority motorists, in contrast, are very likely to 
get caught once stopped by a trooper. 
 
 107. This searching strategy is a form of racial profiling that biases the data. Racial profiling 
is just one selection mechanism that would bias the data; the model I use controls for whatever 
selection criteria the MSP actually use. 
 108. The hypothetical data are simply for illustrative purposes. I created the hypothetical 
data with two goals: first, in order to make the final graph—Panel C—demonstrate the same 
offense level across minority status and second, to create a reasonably accurate racial mix of 
highway drivers. 
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These graphs simply illustrate that the data describing every 
search the MSP have conducted are necessarily incomplete; without 
knowing what the hypothetical data on the stopped vehicles look like, 
one cannot make inferences about racial profiling using the search 
data. Luckily, there are statistical methods that provide a “best guess” 
of what the hypothetical data look like, and thereby control for the 
bias inherent in the decision to search selected vehicles. 
So what would these figures look like if the MSP did not engage 
in racial profiling? How many innocent drivers and drug couriers 
would be searched? And how much contraband would the MSP find? 
These are the questions answered by the next three models. 
B. Benefits to Profiling: Contraband Seized 
The first model I estimate investigates which variables in a 
trooper’s search profile are most predictive of the amount of 
contraband likely to be found. If the MSP’s goal is to maximize the 
amount of drugs seized, this model determines what the MSP’s profile 
should be—factors that truly correlate with carrying large amounts of 
drugs. In order to control for the bias introduced because of the 
MSP’s nonrandom selection of vehicles to search, I use a Heckman 
selection model that estimates the quantity of drugs carried by a 
random sample of stopped vehicles on I-95, even though the data are 
not a random sample of stopped vehicles.109 The Heckman selection 
model first estimates a selection submodel that determines which 
stopped vehicles get searched; this submodel is essentially the same as 
the model described earlier in Part II. Then, the Heckman model uses 
the results of that submodel described in Part II.B to control for the 
selection bias in a second submodel that estimates the outcome of 
interest (in this case, quantity of drugs seized).110 
 
 109. See generally James J. Heckman, Sample Selection as a Specification Error, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979). 
 110. The selection model does not control for the potential selection bias inherent in data of 
all stopped vehicles, rather than all vehicles—i.e., the bias due to the initial selection of which 
vehicles to stop. This selection bias is almost certainly less salient than the bias introduced by 
the decision to search; the troopers have much less information when deciding to stop a vehicle 
than when deciding to search a stopped vehicle. To test this assumption, I re-ran the Heckman 
models using only stops and searches that occurred at night, when the troopers have even less 
information and have more difficulty discerning the race of a motorist before stopping the 
vehicle. The substantive results do not change significantly. Because only slightly less than half 
the data is used, however, the statistical significance for several variables is lower. 
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While it may seem that the Heckman selection model gives one 
something (information about the drugs carried by individuals who 
are not searched) for nothing (no data is actually available), this is not 
the case. The Heckman selection model is not magic;111 rather, the 
idea is simply to extrapolate the information from the fact that the 
individuals were not selected to be searched. Essentially, the selection 
model exploits the observable differences in the two populations—
those searched, and those only stopped—to correct for the bias in 
looking only at the quantity of drugs actually possessed by the 
searched subgroup. Through this process, the model provides a best 
guess of what (and how much) drugs the unsearched motorists would 
carry, using this to create estimates based upon the entire population 
of stopped vehicles, rather than just the subset of those that were 
searched.112 In order to do this, as with any statistical model, the data 
must have some variability—that is, for any given characteristic, some 
motorists with that characteristic must be searched, and some must 
not be. This variability is what identifies the parameters, allowing for 
an accurate estimation of the parameters. 
In addition, to work well, the two Heckman submodels should 
include different independent variables, which provide the traction 
necessary to identify, or estimate accurately, the model.113 Without 
 
 111. This is not to belittle the idea in any way; indeed, James Heckman won the 2000 Nobel 
Prize in Economics for his insights in this area. See Nobelprize.org, The Bank of Sweden Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel: 2000 (noting that Heckman won “for his 
development of theory and methods for analyzing selective samples”), at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2000 (last modified Apr. 14, 2005). But Heckman, too, 
recognizes the limits of his model. See James Heckman & Bo Honore, The Empirical Content of 
the Roy Model, 58 ECONOMETRICA 1121, 1122 (1990) (noting that the Heckman model can be 
identified by model assumptions alone, and that care must be taken to make sure that the data 
are driving the results). 
 112. As an example, suppose that the selection equation—just like the one estimated in Part 
II.B—estimates that Troopers A and B search 5 percent of the vehicles they stop, and find, 
respectively, an average of two grams and four grams of cocaine per stop, after controlling for 
other factors. Suppose further that the model estimates that Trooper C searches 10 percent of 
the vehicles stopped, and finds seven grams of cocaine on average, after controlling for other 
factors. The Heckman selection model then assumes that a motorist’s chance of being searched 
is correlated with the amount of drugs the motorist carries. The Heckman selection model 
estimates that motorists who have a 10 percent chance of being searched carry about seven 
grams of cocaine, and motorists who have a 5 percent chance of being searched carry about 
three grams of cocaine. The model extrapolates to motorists who have even lower (or higher) 
chances of being searched, and thereby provides a best estimate of what the unsearched 
motorists stopped on the highway are carrying. 
 113. Identification, in statistical terms, is an important concept concerning what information 
is driving the results: information from the data or from the model assumptions. Ideally, one 
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different independent variables in the two submodels, there is nothing 
in the data itself that allows an investigator to distinguish between 
different hypotheses; any estimation of coefficients results primarily 
from modeling assumptions, rather than from the data. 
My identification strategy relies upon the individual trooper 
fixed effects. Essentially, I assume that individual troopers differ 
significantly in the threshold of suspicion they require in order to 
conduct a search, and, therefore, individual troopers have different 
base search probabilities. Once the decision to conduct a search is 
made, however, I assume that every trooper would find the same 
contraband—that is, that the troopers would be equally thorough 
once the initial decision to conduct a full search is made. 
The model estimates the probability of drug possession in the 
population of stopped cars by extrapolating across different officers. 
Table 4 provides a simplified version of how my identification 
strategy works. For clarity, I merge individual troopers into three 
groups based on their individual probability of conducting a search. I 
create three groups: troopers whose search probability is low (less 
than 0.2 percent), medium (0.2 percent to 0.5 percent), or high (more 
than 0.5 percent). Focus first on the second column of data in Table 4, 
which provides the percentage of drug couriers found among the 
searches conducted. As the probability of searching increases, so does 
the probability of finding a drug courier—suggesting that MSP who 
search more vehicles are selecting the right vehicles. Extrapolating to 
the concept of searching all stopped cars suggests that the underlying 
percentage of drug couriers among stopped vehicles is greater than 
4.4 percent. This upward trend presages the formal results from this 
model, which estimate an overall rate of 7.2 percent for all stopped 
cars. 
In contrast, the first and third columns show no monotonic 
relationship. This suggests that there is no clear direction in which the 
population of stopped cars differs from the set of searched cars. And 
again, the formal results agree: the models estimate no significant 
selection bias—that is, they find no statistically significant difference 
between the population of stopped cars and the set of searched cars, 
in terms of either the hit rate for drug possession or the value of drugs 
possessed.  
 
wants to identify the results from the data rather than the model assumptions, which are 
somewhat arbitrary. 
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TABLE 4.  TROOPER-SPECIFIC PROBABILITY OF SEARCH AND 
CONTRABAND FOUND (NO CONTROL FOR SELECTION BIAS) 
Search Probability 
Value of Drugs 
Seized per Search % Drug Courier % Hit Rate 
Low (less than 0.2%) $1.45 1.2 36.6 
Medium (0.2-0.5%) $1.33 2.6 33.7 
High (more than 0.5%) $1.63 4.4 34.9 
Having discussed the Heckman model in general and my 
identification strategy in particular, I turn to the actual model and its 
results. There are several independent variables that I incorporate 
into the model to determine whether they are correlated with the 
quantity of drugs actually carried by a particular motorist. The first of 
these variables is race: if race is statistically significant in this model, it 
implies that the amount of drugs traveling up and down the highway 
in Maryland varies by the race of the driver carrying them—and 
therefore that racial profiling has some benefit in terms of the amount 
of drugs seized by the MSP.114 Whether the driver’s race is a salient 
factor in determining the quantity of drugs seized is the primary 
question this Section seeks to answer. It is also important, however, to 
control for other variables that possibly correlate with the amount of 
drugs carried in order to isolate the relative importance of race. These 
other variables, if statistically significant, are also interesting in their 
own right; they constitute actual indicators of the likelihood that a 
vehicle is carrying drugs and should, therefore, define the MSP’s 
search profile. For this reason, I include them.115 In order to estimate 
this model, I combine the total amounts seized for crack and powder 
cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, based upon the street value of the 
drugs seized.116 I limit my analysis to these because the “other” 
category is too varied to convert to a simple cash value. Dispensing 
 
 114. This does not mean that racial profiling needs to target blacks or other minorities. It 
may be that whites carry larger quantities of drugs than blacks or Hispanics do, implying that 
profiling whites would increase the quantity of drugs seized. 
 115. Thus, I control for sex of driver, direction of travel, the vehicle’s region of origin, 
whether the vehicle is a luxury model, and the interaction of luxury vehicle with race, age of 
vehicle, and whether the driver received a ticket. See supra Part II.A. 
 116. Because crack and powder cocaine represent the bulk of the drugs seized, I ran several 
alternate models using the total amount of drugs seized, with different composite measures of 
total drugs seized (equalizing either estimated number of dosages or estimated value of drugs 
seized). The substantive results were unchanged. For ease of discussion, I concentrate on 
powder drugs in this portion of the analysis. 
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with this category should not affect the results significantly, as these 
drugs are only found in 1.4 percent of the searches. 
Table 5 provides the model’s estimate of the effect of each 
variable on the value of the drugs seized.117 The average stopped 
vehicle driven by a white male from Maryland traveling northbound 
carries $6 worth of drugs. The model estimates an additional $2.7 
million of drugs among those stopped vehicles that are not 
searched.118 Turning to the specific factors that correlate with greater 
drug possession, the model indicates that the driver’s race plays only a 
marginal role in predicting the value of drugs carried. There is no 
statistically significant difference in the estimates of the value of drugs 
carried by black, Hispanic, and white men after controlling for other 
factors. Hispanic women, however, carry $2 worth of drugs on 
average, or one-third the amount that white men do. This difference 
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.119 A somewhat 
surprising result is that white motorists driving luxury vehicles carry 
almost $20 worth of drugs on average, although this finding is only 
marginally significant. In contrast, black motorists driving luxury 
vehicles carry only $4.69 on average—about three-quarters of the 
amount carried by white men in nonluxury vehicles, and less than 
one-quarter as much as white motorists in luxury vehicles. This is 
directly contradictory to the MSP’s chosen profile, which samples 
black men, particularly those in luxury vehicles, at higher rates. These 
results are also contrary to what most law enforcement personnel 
believe, and even to what many civil rights activists believe to be the 
case.120 Nonetheless, the model provides a best estimate of the mean 
value of drugs carried by the general population of drivers stopped on 
the highway, rather than the significantly skewed quantity of drugs 
carried by the subgroup of drivers searched. This conclusion suggests 
that the MSP profile’s focus on black and Hispanic men121 does a poor 
job of maximizing the value of drugs seized on I-95. 
 
 117. To estimate the model, I transform the cash value of the drugs seized to the logarithmic 
scale in order to stabilize the variance. Specifically, I use the transformation y = log(cash value 
+1) to avoid taking the logarithm of zero. In the tables that follow, however, I transform the 
logged value back to the standard scale for ease of discussion. 
 118. To make this estimate, I simply calculate the estimated average value of drugs carried 
by each type of motorist and sum across all nonsearched vehicles. 
 119. Given the number of nonsignificant relationships found and the magnitude of the p-
value, even this relationship may represent random variation. 
 120. See supra note 83. 
 121. See supra Part II.B. 
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TABLE 5.  ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF  
DRUGS SEIZED IN STOPPED VEHICLES 
Variable
122
 Value of Drugs Seized
123
 P-Value 
Baseline     $5.98
124
 N/A 
Race/Sex of Driver 
(Control: White Male) 
  
Black Male $8.93 0.231 
Hispanic Male $6.47 0.828 
White Female $12.69 0.237 
Black Female $14.86 0.906 
Hispanic Female $1.87 0.016 
Luxury Vehicle/White Driver $19.30 0.094 
Luxury Vehicle/ Black Driver $4.69 0.015 
Luxury Vehicle/ Hispanic Driver $16.33 0.954 
State of Origin 
(Control: Maryland Plates) 
  
Northeast Plates $3.98 0.270 
New York Plates $2.93 0.168 
Southeast Plates $2.37 0.016 
D.C. Plates $6.21 0.979 
Non-East Coast Plates $2.17 0.006 
K-9 Alert $4.94 0.527 
Grounds “Nervous”
125
 $4.01 0.308 
Owner Not Present $6.54 0.696 
Ticket $9.26 0.020 
Traveling South $11.30 0.009 
Older Vehicle $4.76 0.312 
 
 122. Statistically significant variables and their corresponding values are shown in bold. 
 123. This column represents the average additional (above the baseline) value of drugs that 
a driver of this description will have, holding all other variables fixed at their medians, which is 
the baseline value. 
 124. This is the average value of drugs seized for “baseline” motorists: white men speeding 
north in their newer, nonluxury cars with Maryland plates. 
 125. Being nervous when stopped seems ubiquitous; in this context, an individual stopped 
on the highway is “nervous” if the officer conducting the search lists nervousness as one of the 
grounds for the search. The results of the model confirm the intuition that after controlling for 
other factors, nervousness of the driver, as reported by an MSP trooper after the fact, is not 
correlated with the quantity of drugs carried. 
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In the course of controlling for factors other than race that might 
affect the value of drugs carried, the model predicts what the MSP’s 
profile should be. Few factors are statistically significant; the value of 
drugs carried does not, apparently, vary across many factors. Three 
variables do have some predictive power. Motorists in stopped 
vehicles from off the East Coast carry an average of $2.17 worth of 
drugs or about two-thirds less, for white men, than motorists from 
Maryland. Again, this contradicts the MSP’s profile, as the MSP 
searched vehicles with non-East Coast plates 1.7 times as often as 
vehicles with Maryland plates.126 Similarly, vehicles from the 
southeastern United States carry only $2.37 worth of drugs. While 
these vehicles were not oversampled as compared to Maryland state 
vehicles, from an efficiency point of view, the MSP should search 
southeastern vehicles less often, rather than equally often. The MSP 
did get one factor right, however: drugs do travel south. A vehicle 
stopped southbound carries, on average, $11.30 worth of drugs, or 
almost double the value of drugs that would be traveling north in a 
similar vehicle. 
C. Benefits to Profiling: Couriers Arrested 
Thus far, I have focused on the MSP’s goal of maximizing the 
quantity of drugs seized by measuring the value of the drugs seized. 
But it may be that the MSP sets as a goal arresting the maximum 
number of drug couriers, instead of, or in addition to, maximizing the 
quantity of drugs seized. Seizing drugs removes them from the street, 
but arresting people keeps drug couriers incapacitated for years. It 
may be that the additional benefit of seizing about $300,000 (2,000 
grams) versus only $150,000 (1,000 grams) of cocaine is marginal at 
best. The motorist will be incarcerated for years in either case,127 and 
while the money involved is a considerable sum for the average 
person, seizing an extra kilogram of cocaine is not even a drop in the 
 
 126. As would be true with any model, the data can only determine the profile in use during 
the time period of data collection. Thus, the data show that the profile used from May 1997 to 
December 2003 did not mirror the profile that would have yielded the maximum quantity of 
drugs seized. The data cannot determine whether the profile was appropriate at some prior 
time, but then became obsolete as drug couriers adapted to the policing strategy. The issue of 
such dynamic behavior is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 127. In both cases, the individual would be eligible to be tried as a drug kingpin. MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 5–612, 5–613 (2002) (setting a threshold of 448 grams, or 16 ounces, of 
cocaine to be tried and sentenced as a “drug kingpin”). 
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bucket of the drug traffic in Baltimore alone.128 The second potential 
benefit of racial profiling I investigate, therefore, is the number of 
drug couriers arrested. I return to investigating all drugs because the 
definition of drug courier requires only one comparison across drug 
types—the cut point for defining the amount of drugs carried by a 
user versus a courier—and therefore using all drugs does not pose 
analytical problems as significant as those that exist when trying to 
model the value of drugs seized across drug types.129 To do this, I 
model the probability that the driver of a stopped vehicle is a drug 
courier. Again, because the search data I use does not contain data on 
what the MSP would have found had they searched stopped vehicles 
randomly, I need to control for the bias that the MSP’s selection 
criteria create by using a Heckman selection model.130 
The Heckman selection model’s estimates of the prevalence of 
drug couriers among the general population of stopped vehicles are 
provided in Table 6 and suggest a different profile from the one 
discussed in Section B. Again, with the exception of Hispanic women, 
race has no direct effect on the outcome—in this case, the probability 
of being a drug courier. However, the interaction between race and 
driving a luxury vehicle is highly salient; white and black motorists 
driving luxury cars have a small probability of carrying sufficient 
drugs to be considered drug couriers. Black men in luxury vehicles 
are 0.58 times as likely to be drug couriers as white men in nonluxury 
cars. In contrast, Hispanic men driving luxury vehicles are 7.55 times 
more likely to be drug couriers than the baseline of white men in 
nonluxury vehicles. Thus, if the MSP’s goal were to maximize drug 
couriers arrested, racial profiling against Hispanic motorists driving 
luxury vehicles would further this goal, but racial profiling targeted at 
black motorists in luxury vehicles would be counterproductive. 
 
 128. Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 751–52 (providing a rough estimate that the 33 
kilograms seized per year represented about 0.5 percent of the cocaine consumed in the 
Baltimore/D.C. metropolitan area per year). 
 129. See supra note 100 (describing the cut points used to discern a drug user from a drug 
courier). A small subset of the drivers carry more than one drug. I define these individuals to be 
drug couriers if any one of the drugs they carry meets the appropriate threshold. If, instead, I 
were to combine the drug amounts by standardizing the amount of each separate drug seized to 
a percentage of the amount necessary to be deemed a drug courier, no additional drivers would 
be labeled drug couriers. 
 130. In this case, I use a variant of the standard Heckman selection model that allows me to 
estimate a model with a binary dependent variable. See G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS 221–23 (1986) (describing the 
Heckman selection model). 
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TABLE 6.  ESTIMATES OF DRUG COURIERS  
ARRESTED IN STOPPED VEHICLES 
Variable131 Relative Risk P-Value 
Baseline: White Male, Non-East Coast 
Plates, Consent Search
132
  
1 N/A 
Race/Sex of Driver (Control: White Male)   
Black Male 2.09 0.184 
Hispanic Male 2.43 0.271 
White Female 1.46 0.757 
Black Female 5.33 0.617 
Hispanic Female     0.00
133
 0.002 
Luxury Vehicle/White Driver     0.00
134
 0.016 
Luxury Vehicle/Black Driver 0.58 0.023 
Luxury Vehicle/Hispanic Driver 7.55 0.012 
State of Origin (Control: Maryland Plates)   
Northeast Plates 1.41 0.646 
New York Plates 1.51 0.631 
Southeast Plates 1.30 0.726 
D.C. Plates 3.19 0.424 
Non-East Coast Plates 0.81 0.779 
K-9 Alert 2.07 0.126 
Grounds “Nervous” 2.00 0.379 
Owner Not Present 1.14 0.764 
Speeding 0.77 0.610 
Ticket 1.00 0.992 
Traveling South 11.15 0.001 
Older Vehicle 0.62 0.317 
 
 131.  Statistically significant variables and their corresponding values are shown in bold. 
 132. The baseline probability of a trooper arresting a drug courier after stopping the vehicle 
is 1.0 percent. 
 133. Again, in the dataset, no Hispanic women—out of 3 searched—carried a large quantity 
of drugs. Thus, the model’s best estimate for the relative risk of being a drug courier for 
Hispanic women is zero, even though the true relative risk is very likely nonzero, although still 
small. 
 134. Similarly, in the dataset, no white men driving luxury vehicles—out of 29 searched—
carried a large quantity of drugs. They did, however, carry just under this amount of drugs. 
Thus, the model’s best estimate for the relative risk of being a drug courier for white men 
driving luxury vehicles is zero, even though the true relative risk is very likely nonzero, although 
still small. 
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Almost no other variables, in fact, are statistically significant in 
predicting whether a stopped driver is a drug courier. Drivers 
traveling southbound are 11.15 times more likely to be drug couriers 
than their northbound counterparts when compared at the baseline 
value. Once again, Hispanic women are significantly less likely than 
others to be drug couriers; in fact, the estimated probability is so low 
as to be almost zero. State of registration, anxiety when stopped, and 
a K-9 unit alerting to drugs are all insignificant. The fact is, very few 
of the variables are predictive at all—except for southbound travel, 
and race when combined with driving a luxury car. 
These results are not directly contradictory with the profile 
described in Section B; the MSP can maximize the value of drugs 
seized, as well as the number of drug couriers arrested, by profiling 
southbound vehicles, while avoiding Hispanic women. The question is 
whether they should also profile Hispanic motorists that drive luxury 
vehicles. The model predicting drug couriers suggests that the 
benefits are high; the model predicting the total value of drugs 
suggests that there is no benefit, but also no cost, in terms of the value 
of drugs seized. This may seem contradictory—after all, the same 
motorists who are drug couriers must be carrying a large amount of 
drugs. It is consistent, however, with insufficient data in the first 
model, which attempts to provide much more specific information (an 
exact value of drugs seized), compared to the simpler question of 
whether the amount exceeds some threshold. Simply put, stopping 
only 275 Hispanic motorists in luxury vehicles does not provide 
sufficient variability in the value of drugs seized to identify the 
“Luxury Vehicle/Hispanic Driver” parameter with enough precision 
to discern an effect. Collection of more data may help in this respect, 
but given that the MSP only stopped 275 such motorists over a period 
of six and one-half years, it may be a long wait to gather sufficient 
data. 
D. Costs to Profiling: Innocent Motorists Searched 
In order to assess the impact of various profiling strategies on 
innocent motorists, the final model I investigate determines what 
factors predict whether a driver is carrying any amount of drugs,135 
that is, the ubiquitous “hit rates” on which many commentators 
 
 135. Once again, I use any type of drug found in this analysis, rather than limiting the 
analysis to powder drugs found. 
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focus.136 I do this for two reasons. First, arresting drug users is another 
potential goal that the MSP may have in their drug interdiction 
program. As being arrested is, at best, a huge inconvenience, arresting 
drug users makes drug use more expensive and less attractive on 
average. Second, investigating hit rates necessarily means 
investigating their opposite: fail rates. And fail rates are important 
because they describe which subgroup of innocent drivers (those not 
carrying any drugs) is most burdened by racial profiling. If, for 
example, blacks are less likely to carry drugs than whites, but more 
likely to be drug couriers, one would conclude two things: profiling 
blacks would increase the number of drug couriers arrested, but it 
would also increase the number of innocent drivers searched. 
It turns out that a variant of this hypothetical is true, when 
confined to Hispanic motorists driving luxury vehicles. Table 7 
provides the details.137 Compared to whites, Hispanic motorists in 
luxury vehicles are 1.01 times more likely to be innocent. Of course, 
1.01 is very close to 1, so this statistically significant finding does not 
have much substantive weight. If, however, the MSP decided to focus 
on Hispanic motorists in luxury vehicles more than they do now, the 
absolute number of additional innocent Hispanics may become quite 
large. Black motorists driving luxury vehicles are less likely to be 
 
 136. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 16, at 78–82 (citing hit rate statistics to argue that “[r]acial 
profiling is neither an efficient nor an effective tool for fighting crime”); Antonovics & Knight, 
supra note 42, at 6–7 (same); Gross & Barnes, supra note 19, at 689–93 (same); KPT, supra note 
18, at 219–24 (modeling whether a motorist carries drugs). 
 137. Before discussing what the three models I estimate in this Part together imply about 
the MSP’s profiling strategy, let me address one further point. The model predicts that the 
baseline rate of innocence, for white men from Maryland, is 73 percent, or, equivalently, that 27 
percent of stopped vehicles have some contraband. This is a very high percentage. The model 
also estimates that the MSP’s selection criteria do not bias the results; the MSP would not get 
different results if they randomly searched stopped vehicles. These two facts are consistent: the 
underlying base rate of offense for stopped vehicles is approximately equal to the offense rate of 
those vehicles that were selected to be searched. This high offense rate suggests that some 
selection is happening at earlier stages—in particular, in the trooper’s decision to stop a 
speeding car, or in the motorist’s decision to carry drugs while driving on I-95. Most likely, the 
decision to stop is not random and is correlated with having drugs. For example, reckless drivers 
may be overrepresented in both stopped vehicles and vehicles that contain drugs. For this to be 
a problem with my analysis of the use of race in profiles, however, the overrepresentation of 
reckless drivers in stops also needs to correlate with race. While I do not have individual-level 
data on the motorists who were not stopped, and therefore cannot control for selection using a 
Heckman-style model, I did re-analyze the results using only stops and searches that occurred at 
night and obtained very similar results. Assuming that it is much more difficult to ascertain the 
race of motorists at night before stopping them, this suggests that my analysis of the racial 
element of the MSP’s profiling is robust to the selection bias inherent in choosing which vehicles 
to stop. 
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either drug couriers or users; they are 1.1 times more likely to be 
innocent than the baseline driver. In sum, even if the MSP did not 
engage in racial profiling, blacks and Hispanics would be 
overrepresented among innocent motorists. Profiling blacks and 
Hispanics exacerbates this problem.138  
What other factors influence innocence rates beyond race? Sex 
of the driver is unimportant; apparently drug use is equal opportunity 
when it comes to gender. Drivers from the southeast and D.C. are 
innocent 0.89 and 0.58 times more often than Maryland drivers, 
respectively. Southbound motorists are about two-thirds as likely to 
be innocent as their northbound counterparts, when compared at the 
baseline value. Whether a K-9 unit alerted to drugs predicts a higher 
likelihood of drug possession. Being particularly nervous or driving a 
vehicle without the owner present are also salient characteristics, 
making searching an innocent driver somewhat less likely, although 
both these factors are only marginally statistically significant. Finally, 
receiving a ticket, rather than a warning or a safety violation, predicts 
a significantly lower innocence rate—these drivers are 0.40 times as 
likely to be innocent as those who do not receive tickets. No other 
factor is statistically significant.139 
 
 
 138. Profiling black and Hispanic motorists may also have created this problem in the first 
place, in that black and Hispanic motorists may choose to carry drugs less often because they 
are searched more often. This is the type of game theoretic argument that economists use in 
their models. Even if the MSP changed their policy, however, this would not necessarily change 
the behavior of black and Hispanic motorists; after all, they drive through many jurisdictions 
quite quickly. Only a wholesale change in the practice of most jurisdictions would lead to a 
significant change in drug possession. 
 139. In the alternate model that uses both consent and nonconsent searches, probable cause 
is the largest determinant of innocent rates. Vehicles searched due to probable cause have 
innocent drivers 1.5 times more often than vehicles subject to consent searches. 
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TABLE 7.  DETERMINANTS OF THE INNOCENCE RATE 
Variable140 
Relative Risk of 
Innocence P-Value 
Baseline:
141
 White Male with Non-East 
Coast Plates 
1 N/A 
Race/Sex of Driver 
(Control: White Male) 
  
Black Male 0.96 0.289 
Hispanic Male 1.10 0.459 
White Female 0.94 0.373 
Black Female 0.86 0.562 
Hispanic Female 1.38 0.857 
Luxury Vehicle/White Driver 0.67 0.000 
Luxury Vehicle/Black Driver 1.10 0.033 
Luxury Vehicle/Hispanic Driver 1.01 0.009 
State of Origin 
(Control: Maryland Plates) 
  
Northeast Plates 0.74 0.542 
New York Plates 0.97 0.204 
Southeast Plates 0.89 0.002 
D.C. Plates 0.56 0.003 
Non-East Coast Plates 0.92 0.726 
K-9 Alert 0.78 0.002 
Grounds “Nervous” 0.83 0.056 
Owner Not Present 0.61 0.078 
Speeding 0.78 0.631 
Ticket 0.40 0.027 
Traveling South 0.66 0.000 
Older Vehicle 0.66 0.741 
 
 
 140. Statistically significant variables and their corresponding values are shown in bold. 
 141. As in Table 1, this value represents the baseline probability that a white male motorist 
stopped on the northbound highway in a newer inexpensive car with Maryland plates is carrying 
drugs. 
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E. The Final Analysis: Costs and Benefits Compared 
Table 8 summarizes the three models that I have discussed in this 
Part, and what each model suggests about the optimal profile for the 
MSP to use. Such a profile would include those variables that 
predicted more drugs seized and drug couriers arrested, while 
simultaneously minimizing the effect on innocent motorists. Only two 
variables unambiguously belong to this category: southbound travel 
and luxury vehicle. Together, they provide a small benefit from 
profiling that does not impose a greater burden on innocent motorists 
than random searches. One cannot say the same about racial 
profiling, however. Race is the best predictor of drug couriers 
available in the data; but using race as a factor in deciding which 
vehicles to search places a huge cost on innocent motorists. 
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TABLE 8.  COMPARISON OF RACIAL  
PROFILING’S BENEFITS AND COSTS 
Profile 
D Value of 
Drugs Seized 
Arrested Drug 
Couriers
142
 
Effect of 
Innocents
143
 
Baseline: White Male, Non-East 
Coast Plates 
$5.98 1 1 
Race/Sex of Driver 
(Control: White Male) 
   
Black Male     —
144
 — — 
Hispanic Male — — — 
White Female — — — 
Black Female — — — 
Hispanic Female -$4.12 0.00 1.38 
Luxury Vehicle /  
White Driver 
$13.32 0.00 0.67 
Luxury Vehicle /  
Black Driver 
-$1.29 0.58 1.10 
Luxury Vehicle /  
Hispanic Driver 
— 7.55 — 
State of Origin 
(Control: Maryland Plates) 
   
Northeast Plates — — — 
New York Plates — — 0.97 
Southeast Plates -$3.61 — 0.89 
D.C. Plates — — — 
Non-East Coast Plates -$3.81 — 0.92 
Grounds “Nervous” — — — 
K-9 Alert — — — 
Owner Not Present — — — 
Ticket $3.28 — 0.40 
Traveling South $5.32 11.15 — 
Older Vehicle — — — 
 
 142. This column represents the relative risk of finding and arresting a drug courier, as 
compared to the baseline value, which holds all variables at their medians. 
 143. This column represents the relative risk of searching an innocent motorist with the 
given characteristics compared to the baseline value, which holds all variables at their medians. 
 144. All cells marked “—” have no statistically significant effect. 
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An optimal profile would have a positive impact on the quantity 
of drugs seized and drug couriers arrested and a negative effect on 
innocents. Second best would be to have a nonnegative (positive or 
zero) relationship on the quantity of drugs seized and drug couriers 
arrested, and a nonpositive (negative or zero) effect on innocents. 
Two factors satisfy the first criteria, but only in the negative: 
according to Table 8, Hispanic women and black motorists driving 
luxury vehicles should not be searched. Doing so would decrease 
drugs seized, find fewer drug couriers, and increase the number of 
innocents searched. While the models provide some traction on 
whom the MSP should avoid, none of the factors satisfy the optimal 
criteria to determine on whom the MSP should focus. However, 
several factors satisfy the criteria for a second-best profile. In order to 
maximize these three goals, the MSP should profile (1) southbound 
travelers (2) Hispanic men driving luxury vehicles; and (3) motorists 
who receive tickets.145 The gain in quantity of drugs seized would be 
somewhat small, but the gain in identified drug couriers could be 
large. Table 9 compares the results of using a few sample profiles 
against the option of random searching. 
TABLE 9: PROFILING COSTS AND  
BENEFITS FOR DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS 
Driver Description 
Value of Drugs 
Seized 
Pr(Drug 
Courier) Innocence Rate 
No Profile; Random Searches $13.39 7.2% 70.5% 
Black Men in Luxury Vehicles $6.74 5.3% 79.6% 
Vehicles Traveling South $15.82 12.1% 71.1% 
White Men $11.15 5.0% 70.7% 
Luxury Vehicles  
Traveling South 
$28.13 3.4% 61.0% 
Hispanic Men in  
Luxury Vehicles 
$18.32 21.7% 80.2% 
White Women $21.48 6.7% 64.1% 
Hispanic Women $1.50 0% 99% 
The first thing that stands out about Table 9 is that Hispanic 
women are truly the optimal subgroup to avoid. They carry very little 
 
 145. It is possible that the decision to write a ticket is made after a search is performed, in 
which case this factor would not be salient. 
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drugs and are estimated by the model to be innocent almost all the 
time. While this is in part due to little variation in the data, the fact 
remains that only one Hispanic woman searched had any contraband, 
and it was worth only $1.49. 
Surprisingly, white women also appear to be good candidates for 
profiling. They carry large average amounts of drugs, are reasonably 
likely to be drug couriers, and have a low innocence rate. These 
effects, however, are not significantly different from profiling white 
men, who do not have such advantages. Interestingly, profiling 
vehicles driving south provides close to the same benefits as profiling 
Hispanic men in luxury vehicles, with fewer innocent motorists 
searched. In addition, Table 9 clearly presents that profiling black 
men in luxury vehicles is counterproductive, as compared to random 
searches. This finding is contrary to the MSP’s actual profile, and 
much of the literature on racial profiling as well. 
CONCLUSION 
As the past twenty years have suggested, there is no magic bullet 
in the war against drugs. Any policy requires trade-offs; using racial 
profiling as a strategy in drug interdiction is no exception. While I do 
not directly weigh the costs and benefits in this Article, it is clear that 
there is scant payoff to using profiles that turn largely on race. Not 
only do such profiles have the potential for exacerbating racial 
tensions by increasing the propensity to search innocent minorities, 
but using profiles can also be directly counterproductive, leading the 
police to ignore signs that suggest a search is in order, particularly 
when they have stopped white men or women. 
My empirical analysis demonstrates that the MSP engaged in 
racial profiling between May 1, 1997, and December 31, 2003. They 
searched black and Hispanic motorists stopped on the highway more 
than 1.5 times as often as white motorists, and these searches cannot 
be explained by nonracial cues. This profile provides some benefits to 
the MSP, particularly in terms of drug couriers arrested. But it also 
comes with specific costs: profiling black motorists in luxury vehicles 
yields fewer drugs and fewer drug courier arrests, and it increases the 
number of innocent motorists subjected to a search. The same is true 
for the MSP’s profiling of Hispanic women. This empirical study 
suggests that there may be some nonracial factors that would be 
effective in a profile, particularly driving southbound, but random 
searches also appear to work about as well as other profiles, with the 
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exception of avoiding black motorists driving luxury vehicles and 
Hispanic women. While this strategy would provide gains in drugs 
seized and drug couriers arrested, without increasing the cost imposed 
on innocent motorists, it is equivalent to profiling all other groups, 
including white motorists. This, of course, may not be politically 
feasible or normatively desirable, but it is important to note that it is 
just as effective a law enforcement tool as profiling Hispanic 
motorists driving luxury vehicles. 
Returning to the example of the Japanese American internment, 
what insight might this empirical study on racial profiling in the 
context of drug interdiction provide? First, a reality that is 
counterintuitive to many—that black motorists are not more likely to 
carry large amounts of drugs, and, in fact, are more likely to be 
completely innocent of drug crimes—may in fact be true. Taking the 
analogy further, it may be true that the Japanese American 
internment was counterproductive, in that interning a different group 
of people would have provided significantly more benefits. This is not 
to say, of course, that any internment is necessarily appropriate. I 
only wish to emphasize that the reality that people believe to be true 
at a given time—that the Japanese Americans were more likely to be 
dangerous traitors, or that black and Hispanic motorists are more 
likely to carry drugs (and large amounts at that)—may be false, and 
relying upon these assumptions may be directly counterproductive. 
I come, finally, to the question that this Article speaks to but 
does not answer: is racial profiling worth the cost? By quantifying the 
benefits and some of the costs of racial profiling, this Article provides 
a first step in answering this question. There it stops, however, 
allowing the reader to answer this normative question. 
